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2. Abstract 
 
We started out this master thesis for developing a greater foundation and knowledge for later 
quantitative studies of the phenomenon of blurring in inter-firm communication. We 
performed 8 in depth interviews with different candidates from different business regions in 
Norway. We tried to draw on findings through literature studies combined with findings from 
interviews to establish a better understanding of how and if blurring appear as a common 
phenomenon in business to business relations. First of all we found that blurring actually is 
observable in real life. We found implications about blurring with regards to being more 
likely in short-term business relationships than long-terms. Further we also found an 
indication about blurring being more likely when a firm is less dependent on the other part 
than vice versa. This knowledge is important to develop a better understanding about how to 
govern relations and how to communicate with other firms. 
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3. Introduction: 
 
As mentioned in the Preface, we are two students with background from International 
Management studies at the University of Agder. This has in a lot of areas shaped our interests 
and knowledge areas and is why the presented assignment with inter-organizational 
communication appealed so much to us. We have been addressing a lot of similar areas in 
previous subjects at the university and felt we had a good background for writing this 
assignment.  
 
Our research began in January of 2010. We wanted to explore more about inter - 
organizational relationships and communication, and especially focus on a type of- or a 
subject related to opportunism, namely the concept of blurring. Information blocking and 
distorting is something that might infer a lot of economical consequences upon a firm if they 
are not able to defend against blurring tactics, or see through others speculation in this field. 
We want to contribute to the research upon this field by raising the level of awareness about 
this phenomenon and try to discover a little bit more about how common this is and how it 
presents itself. 
 
Blurring is a very new concept, and little literature can be found about the notion. Our thesis 
advisor has her - self (in collaboration with Otto Andersen), written a paper about blurring, a 
paper we found very useful in our own research.  
 
Although the concept of blurring is very new, blurring tactics has been used for a long time in 
inter - firm relationships. When interviewing our respondents, vey few of them had ever heard 
about the theoretical construct, but when explained to them they soon discovered that blurring 
has and still is a part of their business-to-business relationships.  
 
We started out with searching for relevant theoretical foundations for our thesis. Transaction 
Cost Theory and Relationship Theory were two theories that stood out early in our process. 
Transaction Cost Analysis is important and valuable for our thesis because it seems to explain 
and suggest a lot of scenarios where opportunism might be more likely than otherwise. It is 
the same with relationship theory, here we can find a lot of theory that helps us build research 
question and shape our thesis into shedding light upon the areas we find interesting.  
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To further shed light on this we interviewed respondents from several local companies, and 
also a few from other parts of the country.  The responses varied and we soon saw that some 
respondents were more willing to open up than others. 
 
We will hereby draw upon theories behind the phenomenon of blurring, combine them with 
findings from interviews, and try to get closer to answer our problem definition that is:  
 
To what degree is blurring observable as a common phenomenon in inter-organizational 
relationships? 
 
Finally we will discuss some managerial implications and give some advice for further 
research. 
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4. Theoretical Foundations 
 
4.1 Communication 
 
When thinking of communication, the first thing that might come to mind is language and 
conversation. Several things interact through communication, animals and human inventions 
like computers, humans themselves and so on. For this thesis however, it will be most 
relevant to focus on human beings and organizations. Normally communication involves 
more than one person, most often two and sometimes even more than two people. 
Organizations can communicate with each other as well, if there are no identifiable humans 
behind communication being done for instance. Although we assume that the only thing being 
able to use communication for opportunistic acts in a business situation is human being. 
 
First let us elaborate on another assumption. For tactics being used in an inter-firm 
communication scenario there must be two identifiable persons responsible for the 
communication being done. Or at least we have to for simplistic purposes to model it that 
way. Even though there might be teams of persons on each side of the relationship doing the 
communication, it is a lot easier to look at questions at hand as if there were only one person 
on each side. We can call them participants or parties for that matter. For the models sake we 
will keep it at two parties, one sender and one recipient of information.  
 
This type of communicative model is well known within the field of cognitive psychology, 
and is also nicely portrayed in the article written by Andersen, and Nyhus (2009). “The sender 
decides which knowledge to be sent and encode this knowledge to facilitate the transfer. The 
receiver decodes the transferred information into his/her interpretation of the knowledge. This 
decoding is a complex cognitive process, involving perception, learning, interpretation, 
association and reasoning.” (Andersen and Nyhus, 2009). 
 
4.2 Inter-firm communication 
 
There has been done a lot of research on inter-firm communication with several research 
goals. Communication between purchaser and supplier is the area we wish to look research 
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with this thesis. To site Large (2005); “Communication is one of the most important 
behavioral aspects in business life” (Large, 2005). Håkanson found that Swedish purchasers 
dedicate around 20% of their time to external communication with suppliers (As cited in 
Large, 2005). And Large (Large et al, 2003) got similar findings with purchasers spending 
about 30% of their working hours on external communication with suppliers. Further on 
communication might be the most important factor for building good relationships. Morris et 
al (1998) did a survey where they got a list of key factors associated with successful 
relationships over time. The number one ranked factor was frequent communication between 
parties. As cited in Large (2005) Mohr and Spekman (1994) showed that as communication 
quality in supplier-customer relationships rises, satisfaction also rises.  
 
Inter-firm communication has been studied on several dimensions; most common is probably 
the dimension of communication frequency or intensity (Katz and Tushman, 1979; Boyle and 
Alwitt, 1999 etc), or communication quality (Large, 2005). Large (2005) also found that 
communication quantity had an impact on relationship quality. Relationship quality being 
here identified as a measure of trust, understanding, and readiness to help and cooperate. 
Large’s (2005) results suggest that sharing strategic information can help increase relationship 
quality. And this brings us closer to the main motivation behind our study, information 
blurring. Within inter-firm communication it is suggested that firm’s should communicate 
openly (Large, 2005), with this come risks regarding opportunistic acts from the other part of 
the relationship. Examples are found throughout business history of businesses stealing ideas 
from one another, and therefore a lot of businesses also start to block or distort information to 
protect them from this type of opportunism. This defending behaviour is what we look at as 
blurring. Blurring might manifest itself at many levels of communication, both being used as 
a tactic for exploitation of human cognition shortcuts or as a defence, such as just mentioned.  
 
4.3 Blurring 
 
So what is blurring? Well as discussed earlier, blurring is a type of opportunism where 
distortion/blocking form or content of information has the goal of making one party benefit, at 
least over a short-term period. The long-term relationship is put in the hot seat, and maybe 
overlooked or under-emphasised. If the relationship was in the beginning non-profitable for 
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the part considering opportunistic acts, then it might not be rationally the wrong move if we 
presume the firm is not under moral scrutiny of the public. Public relations are for most firms 
however very important and thereby it is normally better for the company to stay within moral 
and ethical guidelines. 
 
The difference between blurring and opportunism, or what makes blurring stand out is as 
Wathne and Heide (2000) describe it, “Opportunism concerns mainly behaviour – either 
refraining from or engaging in particular actions” (Wathne and Heide, 2000). Blurring on the 
other hand deals with the content and form of information transferred between the exchange 
partners (Andersen and Nyhus, 2009).  
 
Companies compete with each other on multiple arenas and fields, and therefore companies 
should do what they can to constantly be on the same level if not in front of their immediate 
competitors. How can firms achieve this? One area of approach might be to get better 
relationships with other firms, being for instance buyers or sellers at some level of the supply 
chain. As Cohen and Levinthal put it (1990); “Knowledge transfer in an inter-firm 
relationship is a critical factor to achieve competitive success” (Cohen and Levinthal 1990).  
 
Open, sincere, and substantive communication is the most important element to a successful 
inter-firm relationship (Anderson and Weitz, 1989; Bleeke and Ernst, 1993). When firms 
participate in relationships they have to communicate whether they want to or not, thereby 
they will also expose themselves to leak some of the important characteristics of their firm, 
their organisation or their contractual terms like for instance profit margins, market influence, 
number of competitors, prices, costs etc. We would like to from now on just address this 
mainly as sensitive information. On the other hand, sensitive information about the other 
company might also present itself to the initial participant. This is a phenomenon that goes 
both ways. We can imagine forms of blurring being used by both participants simultaneously 
to get an advantage over the other part in the relationship. 
 
There is also drawn a division between passive and active opportunism. Passive opportunism 
means that one exchange partner fails to follow up on his/her obligations in the contract, 
while active opportunism occurs when one exchange partner consciously performs actions 
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that are prohibited in the contract. These forms of opportunism are considered under existing 
and new circumstances (Wathne and Heide, 1997). 
 
What we would like to discuss more closely in this part of the thesis is a form of opportunism 
that might be both passive and active, it distinguishes itself as being opportunism with regards 
to content and form of information transferred between the exchange partners (Andersen and 
Nyhus, 2009). A good portrait of this phenomenon is that in a sender – receiver framework, 
blurring is present when the sender deliberately distorts the knowledge to be sent (Andersen 
and Nyhus, 2009). We can imagine both a seller and a buyer being the sender of such 
distorted information. 
 
But first of all; is blurring tactics just a theoretical construct or also something that occurs in 
the business world. To find an answer to these queries, we came up with two research 
questions. 
 
Research Question 1 A: To what degree does the exchange partner believe that blurring 
tactics is commonly used in business relationships?  
 
Research Question 1B: To what degree does the exchange partner believe that blurring 
tactics is being used in their business/business relationships?  
 
Another thing we were interesting in finding was if our respondents had experiences of 
blurring tactics. We wanted to find these examples and also look more into what sort of 
information was more likely to be blurred. From this we composed another research question. 
 
Research Question 2: What type of knowledge/information is believed being most likely to 
be blurred by the exchange partner?  
 
This brings us to question in what circumstances blurring is most likely to happen, and for 
that we next visit a theory explaining some circumstances of a relationship that might increase 
or decrease the likelihood of opportunistic acts and/or blurring.  
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4.4 Transaction Cost analysis: 
 
In this analysis the people see the firm as a ”governance structure”. A firm tries to find the 
governance structure that best can minimize the its transaction cost. 
 
According to the transaction cost analysis (TCA) we have three general types of governance 
structures, these are; market, hierarchy and hybrid mechanism. In hierarchy they achieve 
coordination through direct control. As we can read from the name there is a large hierarchy 
in the firms that uses hierarchy as a governance structure. What we mean by hierarchy is that 
the firm is organized in several levels, where the people on the top level have most of the 
power and makes most of the important decisions in the firm. The people on the lower levels 
have to follow the instruction from the people higher up in the hierarchy, which means that 
the boss has the power to tell his workers what to do. The communication flows mostly down 
in the hierarchy. The power distance is also large in this type of firm, which means that 
workers accept that their boss has the power and accepts that they do not have too much to 
say about what happens in the firm (internet 3, assessed 02.03.10, 10:37). In the market 
structure there is less control mechanism, more freedom for the workers to make their own 
decisions and the power distance is small. The communication flows both ways and there is a 
lot less hierarchy is these firms.  
 
A definition for transaction cost is “the cost of running the system” (Rindfleisch and Heide, 
1997). Examples of transaction cost can be time and resources it takes to negotiate a contract 
(ex ante cost) or resources it takes to monitor one of its partners (ex post cost). The 
framework includes direct cost and opportunity cost. Direct cost is “a cost that can be directly 
traced to producing specific goods or services” (internet 1, assessed 04.02.10, 14:21). While 
opportunity cost is “the cost of an alternative that must be forgone in order to pursue a certain 
action” (internet 2, assessed 04.02.10, 14:23) 
 
Important aspects for TCA are opportunism and trust. These are important aspect that fit well 
into a research study of inter - organizational relationship. Opportunism is always a concern 
for people and organizations involved in a relationship. The fear that your partner will betray 
you by acting opportunistically will always be part of any kind of relationship. Trust is 
important for a well functional and long lasting relationship; with trust the partners in a 
13 
 
relationship will not be as afraid of opportunistic behaviour. When studying inter - 
organizational relationships these aspects are important to consider. 
 
4.4.1 Bounded rationality: 
 
One of the major assumptions in the transaction cost theory is bounded rationality. Bounded 
rationality is the reality that people are not able to consider all possibilities when making a 
decision. One definition is “the capacity of human beings to formulate and solve complex 
problems is limited” (Douma and Schreuder, 2008). We have limitation when it comes to our 
cognitive capabilities and also limits when it comes to our rationality. When we are making a 
decision we are not able to know everything about that decision. Because of that we do not 
always make the optimal decision. A person can take advantage of people bounded rationality 
and try to blur the information they transfer to their partner in a relationship.  
 
Usually people intend to act rationally, but their limitation stops them from doing so 
(Rindfleisch and Heide, 1997). Bounded rationality is especially a problem in environments, 
which is uncertain and complex (Douma and Schreuder, 2008 page 163).  In such an 
environment we usually need a formal agreement, in the form of a contract. This contract 
needs to be negotiated and written down. A simple and certain environment is for example 
when someone is buying petrol, here we do not need a contract and we are all very sure about 
what we get and how much we have to pay for the product. An example of a complex 
transaction is for example when a government buys a new weapon system. Here there is a 
need for a written contract, which usually is very complicated. There are also a lot of 
questions that needs to be negotiated and answered (Douma and Schreuder, 2008 page 163).  
The relationship we are studying will be more complex than buying petrol. Even if a company 
is just buying a product from another company that will involve a negotiating process and a 
complex contract.  
 
In an uncertain environment we have both behavioral uncertainty and environmental 
uncertainty. Behavioral uncertainty is the uncertainty surrounding the performance of people 
we interact with. It is not possible to know exactly how people will react in every situation, 
which at times may create problems in a relationship. It is also not possible to always know if 
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we can trust the people we interact with. Behavioral uncertainty also occurs when we are not 
sure if the other part has followed the agreement between them. It is not always easy to know 
if the other part has done all they could do in order to follow the agreement. They might have 
failed, but it is not simple to know if they failed on purpose or because of certain events that 
they did not have control over (Douma and Schreuder, 2008 page 163 and Rindfleisch and 
Heide, 1997). Behavioral uncertainty is especially a problem in relationship, also when it 
comes to blurring. You cannot be sure how your partner will act, and if he will use blurring 
tactics.  
 
Environmental uncertainty is when there are circumstances in the environment, which we 
cannot control. These circumstances have the possibilities to cause problems for a 
relationship. The main focus here is the problem of adoption; people have problems adopting 
their agreements as the circumstances in the environment changes. We prefer to just keep it as 
it was at the beginning, and do not wish to change it even if that is what is needed. It is more 
or less impossible to write an agreement, which consider all possible outcomes and consider 
everything that can happen and go wrong. That is why we have to change agreements as the 
environments and circumstances changes (Rindfleisch and Heide, 1997). Environmental 
uncertainty is a problem especially with measuring, because when we try to measure 
something we would prefer as little change as possible. This is because no change makes it 
easier to measure (Rindfleisch and Heide, 1997).  
 
When it comes to blurring, it is possible to take advantage of peoples bounded rationality to in 
order to get a head in a relationship and the negotiating process (Andersen and Nyhus, 2009). 
You can take advantage by the fact that people do not have all the facts, and if you figure out 
what they do not know you can use this to your own benefit. 
 
4.4.2 Opportunism: 
 
Another assumption is opportunism. In TCA one assumes that people would, if they had the 
opportunity, to act in their own self-interest. This could be at the expense of the other parties 
in the relationship. It is difficult to know who is honest and who would act opportunistically, 
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before an agreement is agreed upon, especially if you have never worked with this person 
before (Barney, 1990).
1
 
 
Williamson (1985) defines opportunism as “self – interest seeking with guile”(Williamson, 
1985 p. 47)
1. This can be understood as people trying to “exploit a situation for its own 
advantage” (Douma and Schreuder, 2008).  Under opportunism we find behaviour such as 
lying, stealing, distort, disguise, cheating or violating an agreement (Rindfleisch and Heide, 
1997).  
 
As we have explained before, opportunism can be divided into two behaviours.  The first one 
can distort information, which means lying, cheating and stealing. It also involves more subtle 
behaviour such as misrepresenting information, by not disclosing all the information. The 
second behaviour is not fulfilling your promised commitments, by shirking your 
responsibilities (S. Lui, Wong and W. Lui, 2008).   
 
Although Williamson (1985) has opportunism as a large part of its TCA framework, does not 
mean that he thinks everybody will act opportunistically. He only assumes that some people 
will take advantage of certain situations, and will therefore act opportunistically. He also 
claims that it is difficult to know who will act opportunistically and who will be honest, 
before you make a deal. Even opportunistically people might not act opportunistically all the 
time, it is very difficult or costly to tell if they will act sincere or not (Douma and Schreuder, 
2008 page 164). Some people think that Williamsons view of people is to pessimistic, that he 
focuses too much on opportunistic behaviour (Douma and Schreuder, 2008 page 164). To 
show that this statement might not be correct, consider this example: 
 
Suppose you are planning to go on holiday this summer, and have decided for Greece. When 
talking to a travel agent you discover that Greece is the popular spot this year. You find a trip, 
but it is expensive and not exactly what you wanted, however you decide to book this trip. 
The next day you are lucky and find a cheaper trip that is exactly what you want. Would you 
not be tempted to take this trip in stead and cancel the first trip? If travel agents did not have a 
contract that is legally binding, than I think most people would agree that a number of 
                                                 
1.Rindfleisch and Heide, 1997 
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customers would cancel the first trip and go for the cheaper trip they found. This is something 
travel agents have thought about, and is the reason why they actually have their customers 
sign legal binding contracts. From this example we see the reason why travel agents spend 
money and time on contracts, not because they think everyone will act opportunistically, but 
because some customers might (Douma and Schreuder, 2008 page 164 - 165).  
 
Opportunistic behaviour can occur ex ante (for example a seller might not tell you if the 
product you buy is defect) or it can occur ex post (for example after you have booked a 
vacation, you might want to get out of it) (Douma and Schreuder, 2008 page 166).  
 
“Ex ante opportunistic behaviour leads to adverse selection”(Douma and Schreuder, 2008). 
When explaining adverse selection, it is common to use an example from the insurance 
industry. What commonly happens is that an insurance company ends up with high-risk 
clients. This is because the people, who are risky, are the people who needs insurance and 
who also ends up buying the insurance. “The high-risk clients have self - selected themselves 
in response to their product offer” (Douma and Schreuder, 2008). According to Williamson 
(1985) adverse selection arises in the insurance industry because of  “the inability of insurers 
to distinguishes between risk and the unwillingness of poor risks candidly to disclose their 
true risk condition” (Williamson, 1985 page 47).  
 
“Adverse selection is a type of information asymmetry”(Douma and Schreuder, 2008). What 
happens is that we have hidden information; one party of the transaction has more information 
about the respectable variables in the transaction, than the other part. This gives the party with 
more information an advantage in the relationship (Douma and Schreuder, 2008). When there 
is asymmetrical information, we often find opportunistic behaviour. For example in a seller –
buyer relationship, the seller usually has more information about the product than the buyer. 
This is something he can use for his own advantage, or even trick the buyer into buying a too 
expensive product (Douma and Schreuder, 2008 page 166).  
 
Ex post opportunism may lead to moral hazard (Williamson, 1985 page 47). Moral hazard is 
like adverse selection, about hidden information. Except that the information hidden occurs 
during the transaction, not before (Douma and Schreuder, 2008 page 73 and 75). If we use the 
insurance example, moral hazard is when people who have insurance do not act responsible. 
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They might take inappropriate risk, because they have insurance and do not feel that they 
have to play it so safe, as they would if they did not have any insurance (Williamson, 1985 
page 47). When we talk about ex post opportunism we mean action that occur after they have 
agreed to go through with the transaction (Douma and Schreuder, 2008 page 73). These 
actions do not need to affect the other parties in a transaction, but it could also harm them and 
possibly end their relationship. If either of the parties suspects such behaviour could happen 
after the transaction, they might not want to take the risk, and the transaction will not transpire 
(Douma and Schreuder, 2008 page 73).  
 
The concept of adverse selection is about hidden information, while the concept of moral 
hazard is more about hidden action (Douma and Schreuder, 2008 page 75). One thing these 
two concepts have in common is that they are both has problems with observation. If all the 
parties in a transaction could, before the transaction went through, observe all the information 
they needed to “prepare and execute the transaction”(Douma and Schreuder, 2008 page 75), 
these two concepts would be irrelevant (Douma and Schreuder, 2008 page 75). Another thing 
these two concepts have in common is that the information between the parties is unevenly 
distributed. One of the parties has information, important to the transaction, which the other 
partner cannot observe. This information is valuable to the transaction, and gives the partner 
with the information an important advantage (Douma and Schreuder, 2008 page 75). The 
information is also private, so the partner with the information can decide for him self if he 
wants to disclose it to its partners. If revealing the information would harm the partner’s 
position in the relationship and harm is interest in the relationship, there is little chance he will 
reveal the information (Douma and Schreuder, 2008 page 75). The last similarity for the two 
concepts is “that both problems may occur in both market and organizational settings” 
(Douma and Schreuder, 2008 page 75). But the two offers different solutions for these 
problems (Douma and Schreuder, 2008 page 75).  
 
The differences between the concepts are the following (Douma and Schreuder, 2008 page 
75).  Adverse selection is an ex ante concept. It occurs from “private information that exists 
before parties agree on a transaction” (Douma and Schreuder, 2008 page 75). Moral hazard 
occurs from hidden actions, which is an ex post concept. “It pertains to hidden information 
that may develop during the execution of a transaction (Douma and Schreuder, 2008 page 75). 
The type of information that is hidden is information about the unobservable behaviour of the 
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partners in the relationship. This behaviour is valuable for the transaction, because it affects 
“the terms of trade in the transaction” (Douma and Schreuder, 2008 page 75). We can again 
use the insurance company example; if the insurance company knows about negligence or 
fraud with someone they insure they will not cover that person. Therefore that person has no 
incentive to tell the insurance company about these matters (Douma and Schreuder, 2008 
page 75).  
 
In a normal market we find a several buyers and sellers, who all trade with each other. In such 
a market, a seller who has acted opportunistically will damage his or her reputation and will 
therefore have problems finding new customers. 
 
A seller’s reputation is important for his sales, if he has cheated several of his costumers and 
this comes out, that will make other possible costumers reluctant to buy from him. This is 
because they are afraid that he will cheat them too, or because they do not want to encourage 
such behaviour, by buying from him. This can also be transferred to an - inter - organizational 
relationship. A firm will not want to work together with another firm who has a bad 
reputation. If they have heard or experienced that this firm has acted opportunistically in the 
past, then the firm will be very reluctant to work with that firm. Unless they do not have 
another firm to work with, they will choose a different partner. If no one knows that you cheat 
your costumers, than you will not be affected by your behaviour. The problem arises when 
you get caught, and that information spreads to your costumers and potential partners (Douma 
and Schreuder, 2008 page 166). This can of course also be transferred to other types of 
relationships, both personal and business. 
 
Especially in cases called “small number exchange” opportunism is a serious problem. In 
these cases we have only one seller. The seller in this marker does not have to consider his 
reputation, because the buyers do not have anywhere else to go. (Douma and Schreuder, 2008 
page 166). 
 
If a seller has a reputation for being honest, a buyer will trust that seller and will not feel the 
need to spend extra money on an inspection, in order to make sure the product is in good 
condition. When trust is involved in the transaction, a buyer will save money on transaction 
cost.  
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TCA claims that a legal contract between partners will reduce opportunistic behaviour. The 
theory say there are several reasons why a legal contract will reduce the opportunistic 
behaviour in a relationship. The first reason is because a contract contains future action for 
future events, it contains formal rules for the relationship and also helps reduce uncertainty in 
the relationship, because with the contract all parties know what to expect. The second reason 
is that a contract tells the parties what is seen as cheating and “illegal” behaviour, it also 
contains what the consequences of such behaviour is. They can use the contract as a reference 
point to judge if some behaviour is opportunism. The third reason is that a contract prescribes 
the nature of the transaction, so that the partners can use the contract to resolve conflicts and 
disputes (S. Lui, Wong and W. Lui, 2008).   
 
“A formal contract provides a monitoring mechanism for a partnership to reduce opportunistic 
behaviours” (Balakrishnan and Koza, 1993)2. A contract shows if either partner has followed 
their part of the agreement and it can also be used as motivation for the partner to fulfil their 
obligations, since if they do not fulfil their obligations the contracts contains different 
penalties for deviations (S. Lui, Wong and W. Lui, 2008).  TCA argues that if a relationship 
uses a formal legal contract, then the partners involved will less likely act opportunistically 
(S. Lui, Wong and W. Lui, 2008).   
 
Opportunism is bad for the performance of a relationship, since the success of a relationship 
relays on both parties. They all need to be willing to work and give something to the 
relationship, in order for it to be a success. (S. Lui, Wong and W. Lui, 2008).  If one of the 
partners does not give it all or even worse work more for their own benefit, the relationship 
will suffer. If the other, more reliable partner realises that its partner has taken advantage off 
them, they will probably no longer want to contribute too much more into the relationship. 
This is because they do not want to lose any more to its partner; they have most likely already 
spent a lot of resources on the relationship and do not want to waste anymore. If this happens 
the relationship is no longer productive, it does not create a competitive advantage for the 
firms anymore. Because of this evidence, TCA are able to claim that “opportunism is 
expected to reduce partnership performance” (S. Lui, Wong and W. Lui, 2008).   
                                                 
2. S. Lui, Wrong and W. Lui, 2008) 
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Opportunism is a problem because people invest a lot of time and resources into a 
relationship, and one expects the other party to behave in a certain way. It could be difficult 
for firm to find another partner to work with, or it could be that the firm cannot afford or do 
not have time to invest in another partnership. A firm risk losing time and resources if its 
partner decides to act in its own best interest and not the relationships (Rindfleisch and Heide, 
1997). 
 
Safeguarding problems often arises with the problem of opportunism. A safeguarding 
problem “arises when a firm deploys specific assets and fears that its partner may 
opportunistically exploit these investments” (Rindfleisch and Heide, 1997). If a firm invest in 
a relationship and especially if they invest in a resource that cannot be used anywhere else 
(asset specificity) then the fear of opportunism is very high. This is because they will have a 
lot to lose, if they have to end the relationship. According to the TCA framework if we have 
high levels of asset specificity in a relationship and therefore a large chance of opportunism, 
there will be high cost concerning safeguarding contracts (Rindfleisch and Heide, 1997).  
 
Opportunism creates cost by having the partners spend resources on monitoring and 
controlling its partner. These recourses could instead be spent on improving the relationship 
or invested into their companies.  
 
According to TCA, if performance evaluation and safeguarding cost are low or absent, the 
economic actors will prefer market governance (Rindfleisch and Heide, 1997). If the same 
costs are higher than the production cost of the firm, the same firm will rather prefer internal 
organization.  TCA has three prior assumptions about organizations that help a firm with its 
organization.  
 
The first assumption is that firms are able to monitor and control behaviour, more than the 
markets are able to. Because of this the firms are also able to reward and measure behaviour 
as well, this also is true with output. With these characteristics firms are more able to detect 
opportunism and are also more able to adapt to changing circumstances.  
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The second assumption is that a firm is able to give rewards, for example through promotions 
inside the company. This could help with the allure of opportunism; one might not be so 
tempted to act opportunistically if you risk the chance for a promotion. 
  
The last assumption is with regards to the firms’ culture and the affects of that culture. A 
firm’s culture and atmosphere is very important to a firm and its employees. A well functional 
organizational culture can help people come together towards a common goal and is also a 
large part of the socialization process inside the firm. This is also affective towards reducing 
opportunistically behaviour (Rindfleisch and Heide, 1997).   
 
4.4.3 Asset specificity:  
 
Another dimension of the TCA framework is asset specificity. “Asset specificity refers to the 
transferability of the asset that support a given transaction” (Williamson, 1985)3. It can be 
defined as “the durable investment that are undertaken in support of particular transactions, 
the opportunity cost of which investments is much lower in best alternative uses or by 
alternative users should the original transaction be prematurely terminated” (Williamson, 
1985 p. 55)
4. It can also be defines as “the asset specificity of a transaction refers to the 
degree to which the transaction needs to be supported by transaction – specific assets” 
(Douma and Schreuder, 2008 page 168).  If an asset is specific, it means that the asset will 
lose value if it is used in an alternative way (Douma and Schreuder, 2008 page 168). 
 
Asset specificity is when a firm invest in something for a relationship, and this investment is 
not worth much outside of this relationship. If an asset has high asset specificity, it means that 
that particular asset will have little or no value outside of that relationship. If for example a 
production firm buys expensive equipment to meet their buyer’s special needs, but this 
equipment is not something their other buyers need. This equipment is only useful for the firm 
as long as they work with the specific firm, which means that the investment is asset specific. 
Firm that cooperate often invest in specific asset for a partnership, either because it is 
something that it really needs or because of goodwill towards its partner. Because of the loss 
of value outside the relationship, the decision about asset specificity is a very important 
                                                 
3.Rindfleisch and Heide, 1997 
4.S. Lui, Wong and W. Lui, 2008 
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decision. If a firm is not quite sure about the relationship and if they do not trust its partner, it 
is not likely that they will invest in such an asset. If a firm feel secure in the relationship they 
are more likely to take such a risk as investing in an asset that is specific for that relationship 
(S. Lui, Wong and W. Lui, 2008).   
 
 
We can use an example from Douma and Schreuder (2008) to proper explain the concept of 
asset specificity. Consider a person (Mr X) who wants to start up a newspaper in a town that 
has no local newspaper. Mr X needs to print the newspaper locally, because that is cheaper. 
There are several printers in this town, but no one has the equipment to print a newspaper. 
One of the printers (Mr Y) would consider buying a press, which would be able to print a 
newspaper. If Mr Y decides to buy this press that press would be a transaction specific asset; 
he can only use the press with Mr X, since that is the only newspaper in town and since it 
would also cost too much money transporting a newspaper to another town. This transaction 
between Mr X and Mr Y would then be characterized by asset specificity and lock in (Douma 
and Schreuder, 2008 page 168 - 169).   
 
“For transactions with high asset specificity, the cost of market transactions is high” (Douma 
and Schreuder, 2008 page 169).  To explain why this is, we can continue using the same 
example. If we suppose that the press bought, had an economic life of five years, because of 
that Mr Y wants a five-year contract with Mr X. It might not seem that writing such a 
contract, would cost a lot. But if we continue with the example, we can illustrate problems 
that may take place.   
 
The fixed costs are $3500 a day, if the press deprecates over five years. The variable costs are 
$1500 per day, the cost it takes to operate the press. Mr Y gets a contract, which entitles her 
$5000 a day. They have a legally binding contract. One day Mr X comes and says that the 
newspaper is not selling as much as he thought. He asks if he can lower the price to $4000 a 
day, because with $5000 he will go bankrupt. If he files for bankruptcy, the press will have no 
use anymore. Because of that Mr Y, sees no other choice than to lower the price. Mr Y would 
actually only have to accept a price higher than $1500, with a price higher than this amount he 
will still have a “positive contribution margin” (Douma and Schreuder, 2008 page 169).  If we 
use economic language, a price higher than $1500 will give a positive quasi rent. By trying to 
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lower the payment, Mr X “tries to appropriate a part of that quasi rent” (Douma and 
Schreuder, 2008 page 168 - 169).  In economic terms, when someone tries to appropriate 
someone else’s quasi rent, they “refer to it as the danger of hold up” (Douma and Schreuder, 
2008 page 168 - 169).   
 
Another example of hold up is from the movie industry. If the first movie of a series of 
movies turns out to be a blockbuster, the cast will usually demand more money for making the 
sequels. When making the Lord of the Ring trilogy, they solved this problem by making all 
the three movies at the same time. This way neither of the actors could demand more money 
when the first movie came out and became a huge hit (Douma and Schreuder, 2008 page 169 
- 170).   
 
Transaction cost theory suggests that asset specificity in a relationship increases the risk of 
opportunism and therefore transaction cost will emerge. A firm is more exposed to 
opportunism when they have invested in asset specificity (S. Lui, Wong and W. Lui, 2008). 
The other firm might see the investment as a golden opportunity for opportunism by trying to 
get as much as possible out of the relationship and then threaten to terminate the relationship 
if they do not get more (S. Lui, Wong and W. Lui, 2008).  
 
TCA claims that a firm will maximize performance in a relationship if they are able to reduce 
opportunism on asset specificity. In a relationship with high asset specificity there tend to be 
more formal contracts. With a contract you have a legal agreement, which contains both 
parties’ obligations and their commitment to the relationship. It is also supposed to contain 
actions for different circumstances that may occur, but of course the contracts are not able to 
consider all possible circumstances. With a legal contract a firm usually feels more secure, 
because they know that they are protected by law and also feel that they have more control 
over the situation. A firm uses a contract to protect their transaction with and to safeguard 
their investment. Contracts are common in these relationships because of the vulnerable 
position the firm are in when it comes to asset specificity, so we expect in a relationship with 
high specific asset investment to see legal contracts involved (S. Lui, Wong and W. Lui, 
2008).   
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We have four types of specific assets; these are physical locations, specific physical assets, 
specific dedicated assets and specific human assets (Payan and Svensson, 2007).  
 
It is not enough to just find out if blurring exists in the business world and find examples. We 
also wanted to see when our respondents used blurring tactics. From this issue we find our 
third research question, which we decided to divide into three different questions. 
Under what circumstances is blurring likely to be used?  
 
Because of the link between asset specificity and the risk of opportunistic behaviour, we 
wanted to see if there could be a link between blurring and asset specificity, which leads us to 
a research question. 
 
Research Question 3A: Is there a link between asset specificity and use of blurring?  
 
Another way to secure an asset specific investment, other than a formal contract, is trust. If a 
relationship has trust, the partners feel more secure and are more willing to make such 
investments. 
 
4.4.4 Trust: 
 
One definition for trust is “the perception of reliability, creditability and benevolence of a 
partner (Johnson et al., 1996; Morgan and Hunt, 1994)
7
. You develop trust in a relationship 
with reliable and fair exchanges between the partners. If you have worked with a partner, and 
that partner has not cheated you but acted honest, then trust will develop between the partners 
(S. Lui, Wong and W. Lui, 2008).  
 
Some scholars argue that “the tendency of a certain person to behave in an opportunistic way” 
(Goshal and Moran, 1996)
5
 depends on two things; the immediate net benefits of such 
behaviour and disposition toward the transaction partner” (Goshal and Moran, 1996)6. A 
                                                 
7. (S. Lui, Wong and W. Lui, 2008).  
5. Douma and Scgreuder, 2008 
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person will not act opportunistically if he will not reap any benefits from the behaviour, and 
the more he will earn the greater the chance is that he will act opportunistically. The feelings 
the person has towards the partner will also affect how he behaves in the relationship. If he 
see the partner as a friend and has had a good relationship with him, it will reduce the chance 
that he will betray him.  If you are in a trusting relationship with a partner, you are then able 
to be in a long-term profitable relationship with him. Many economists have now recognized 
that trust is very important in a working relationship, and many have tried to “figure out 
which circumstances trust is most likely to develop” (Douma and Schreuder, 2008 page 184).  
 
TCA theory suggests that with long-term relationship, there is less opportunistic behaviour 
(Douma and Schreuder, 2008 page 184). We wanted to see if there is a link between the 
length of a business relationship and the use of blurring tactics. To answer this we came up 
with our forth research question. 
 
Research Question 3B: Is there a negative link between the length of the relationship 
and blurring?  
 
It is important to have “trust both between and within organizations” (Douma and Schreuder, 
2008 page 185). Having trust between organizations can really help them develop an efficient 
long - term relationships with these organizations. To have such long-term relationships is 
very important to an organizations success. It is also important to have trust within the 
organizations that means that the employee places a certain trust in their employee. If an 
employee feels that he is being trusted, he will work harder for that organization. A person 
feels more comfortable, secure and has more confidence to do a great job if he feels that he 
has the employers trust. If a employer spends a lot of time monitoring the employees, that will 
not show the employees that he trust them and it will end up with the employees not wanting 
to do as good a job for the organization. What often happens when a firm monitors its 
employees to close because they think the employees will act opportunistically, is that the 
employees actually behaves opportunistically because of the monitoring. Since they do not 
feel that they are being trusted, they feel betrayed and feel they do not have to act in the 
organizations best interest (Douma and Schreuder, 2008 page 185).   
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“Trust is important for economic exchange” (Douma and Schreuder, 2008 page 185).  
Throughout history trust was built up through personal exchange. Small groups worked 
together and through good experiences they built trust between them. Since the groups where 
small there was a personal context, which allowed the transaction costs to stay relatively 
small. But since the economy expanded, there was less room for personal exchange, and more 
exchange between so called strangers. Because of that more problems concerning transactions 
came to light. They needed to find something to replace “personal trust” with; they need 
“other means of a personal nature” (Douma and Schreuder, 2008 page 185).   
 
We find two important forms of such impersonal trust, in institutions and through reputation.  
 
In institutions people put their trust into the country’s rule of law and its enforcement. This is 
essential in the economic development of a country. If organizations do not trust the 
institutions in a country, they will not feel secure enough to establish business in that specific 
country. It is important that organizations feel that their investment is secure and safe in the 
country they decide to invest in. The other form is reputation. It’s important for an 
organization to have a good reputation that will help them find success exchange partners. If 
an organization has a reputation for being trustworthy, that would put some personal element 
into the relationship. There is not a big chance an organization will have the opportunity to 
develop well functional relationship if they have a reputation for not being trustworthy 
(Douma and Schreuder, 2008 page 185 - 187).   
 
4.4.5. Model for trust: 
 
The model consist of three dimensions of trust, we have calculus - based, knowledge - based 
and identification - based (Hernandez and dos Santos, 2010).  
 
It has been widely recognized that trust is very important for a relationship, both personal and 
business relationship. Trust is “vital for the maintenance of cooperation in society” (Zucker, 
1886)
7
. With trust in a relationship uncertainty about the future is reduced, it reduces the need 
to monitor each other in order to protect them self from opportunistic behaviour. It also lead 
                                                 
6. Hernandez and dos Santos, 2010 
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to a better harmony within the organization, since trust helps eliminating friction and conflicts 
within relationships.  
 
Trust helps reduce to reduce the need for bureaucracy in an organization. If you trust 
someone, you do not feel the need to monitor and control him as much (Hernandez and dos 
Santos, 2010). In several studies researchers have found out that “trust leads to longer and 
more stable relationships” (Andersen & Weitz, 1989; Pavlou, 2002)6, “it reduces the need for 
conflict (Morgan &Hunt, 1994)
6
 and “boosts satisfaction with the relationship” (Andersen & 
Narus, 1990)
6
. 
 
There has always been a problem in academic world to find one common definition for trust. 
It has been normal that researchers from different disciplines define trust differently. For 
example in the discipline economic the researchers “tend to see trust as an economic 
(Williamson, 1993)
6
 or institutional (North 1990)
6
 phenomenon, sociologists see it as a 
property of relationship among people (Granovetter, 1985)
6
 or institutions (Zucker, 1986)
6
 
and psychologist tend to focus on trust as a personality phenomenon (Rotter, 1967)”6. 
Because of this we have several definitions for trust, and even more than one definition for 
each discipline.  
 
This model about is based on a model proposed by Lewinski and Bunker (1995). They have 
tried to develop a scale of trust for a buyer - seller relationship. “The model possesses 
basically most of the qualities that a model for measuring trust in a buyer - seller relationship 
would require” (Hernandez and dos Santos, 2010).  
 
The first quality is that the model proposed by Lewicki and Bunker (1995)
6
 was more 
designed for professional relationships, like the buyer - seller relationship we find in 
organizations. In the model we find different definitions for trust, because they use different 
referents when they analyze. For example one might analyze trust on an individual, group, 
institutions level or a combination of them (Hernandez and dos Santos, 2010). The 
relationship in general might also be different, some relationships are personal and some are 
professional. An example for a personal relationship might be a romantic one, and a 
professional relationship could be one we find between employees in an organizations. The 
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model developed by Lewicki and Bunker (1995) helps us adapt “to the kind of relationship 
that occurs in a buyer-seller relationship” (Hernandez and dos Santos, 2010).  
 
The model also recognizes “that trust is a multidimensional concept” (Butler, 1991; Gabarro, 
1978;Hosmer, 1995;Johnson-George & Swap, 1982;Larzelre & Houston, 1980;Mayer et al., 
1995;Rempel et al., 1985;Rousseau et.al., 1998;Shapiro et.al., 1992)
6
. This is important 
because is you do not take that into consideration; you might “risk losing the wealth of the 
concept” (Gabarro, 1978)6.  
 
Third, the model recognizes that trust is different at each stage of the relationship between the 
parties. The parties in a relationship behave differently at the different stages of a relationship; 
you usually act different in the beginning of a relationship than you would after the 
relationship has lasted for a long time. You need to behave differently at different stages, as 
the circumstances changes. If you want the relationship to sustain and evolve you need to act 
differently as the relationship develops (Lewicki & Bunker, 1995 p. 140)
6
. 
 
In the Lewicki and Buner (1995) model we find that trust exists at three levels, we have 
calculus - based, knowledge - based and identification - based. What the model proposes is 
that trust start at the beginners level called calculative level; here they propose trust has a 
calculative nature. After a while trust may develop to the knowledge level, if they succeed at 
the previous level. And if they keep succeeding they will be able to move up to the 
identification level, “where the trust would be at its highest”(Hernandez and dos Santos, 
2010).  
 
4.4.6 Calculus - based trust: 
 
This trust takes into consideration that when trying to maintain or serve a relationship; there 
are levels of vulnerability based on the calculated cost, the cost it takes to maintain or serve 
the relationship (Williamson, 1993)
6
. Calculative trust is based on the trade-off between risk 
and utility. If a person has two course of action, both involving the same amount of risk, a 
person would choose the course that maximizes its utility. We can put this into a buyer-seller 
relationship, where a person is choosing a business partner. A buyer will work with a seller 
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that maximizes his utility, granted that the sellers he could choose from had the same risk. In 
an article written by Coleman, (1990)
6  
he compares the decision to trust someone with the 
decision to make a bet. Someone who decides to trust someone else knows what he might 
lose, what he might win and what his chances of winning. To help him decide if he want to 
take the bet, that means take the chance and trust in another person, he will look at his 
chances of winning. If the chances of winning are larger than his chances of losing, he will 
take the chance and trust that other person”(Hernandez and dos Santos, 2010).  
 
In order to make calculus - based trust work in a professional relationship, a new definition 
has been proposed. Calculus - based trust can be “referred to a party’s expectancy that buying 
from an exchange partner is more advantageous than not buying from another party” 
”(Hernandez and dos Santos, 2010).  
 
4.4.7 Knowledge - based trust: 
 
This trust is at times called relational - trust (Rousseau et. al., 1998)
6
. This type of trust is a 
trust that is developed between two actors as their relationship develops. “The trust develops 
with time as a result of the track record of interactions that enables both parties to develop 
generalized expectations about the others behaviour” (Shapiro et. al., 1992)”6. It is normal that 
when you work with someone and that experience was good, you will want to work with that 
person again. Over time the trust between you will grow, the more you work together, as long 
as the experience was successful”(Hernandez and dos Santos, 2010).  
 
Shapiro (1992) writes that you need regular communication and courtship in order to develop 
knowledge - based trust (Shapiro et. al., 1992)”6.  If the two parties have an open 
communication flow, where they discuss their needs, concerns and problems that will help 
them develop a well working relationship and knowledge - based trust. This way they are able 
to learn from each other and learn more about each other (Hernandez and dos Santos, 2010). 
Courtship cultures changes from country to country. In the US they expect the courtship to 
not last to long, and want the whole process to go by quick. In contrast, in Japan they expect 
the courtship to last for a long time, they want to really get to know their partner before they 
enter a business relationship with them (Shapiro et. al., 1992)”6.  
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The more you know about your partner, the easier you will be able to predict his behaviour 
and needs (Lewicki and Bunker, 1995)
6. “Trust is built by assessing the success rate in 
previous transaction and predicting the success rate in future transaction” (Hernandez and dos 
Santos, 2010).“The higher the success rates of past encounters, the greater the trust” 
(Hernandez and dos Santos, 2010). Because of this the definition for knowledge - based trust 
is: “the party’s belief that most of his previous transactions with an exchange partner where 
successful (Hernandez and dos Santos, 2010).  
 
4.4.8 Identification - based trust: 
 
This trust is based on the knowledge of “the partner’s desires and intentions” (Lewicki and 
Bunker, 1995)
6. A relationship has trust, because all parties empathize and value each other’s 
desires, this way they can act on each other’s behalf’s (Lewicki and Bunker, 1995)6. With this 
type of trust we find the expression unconditional trust (Jones and George, 1998)
6
. This trust 
comes to live when a relationship goes from the stage where they just work together to the 
stage where “they identify with each other” (Jones and George, 1998)6.  
 
In this type of relationship, where they have identification - based trust, the parties have 
sympathy for each other’s needs, desires and intentions. They also all agree on that they are 
going to act on each other’s behalf, and take care of each other. In this sort of environment, 
with unconditional trust, people feel more secure in disclosing information to its partners. 
This is because they trust that their partners will not use that information against them. In 
order to build a relationship with identification - based trust you need to base the relationship 
on knowledge and predictions of your partner’s preferences and needs, you both should also 
share these preferences.  
 
We define identification - based trust by ”the degree to which a party identifies with the 
exchange partner because he believes that they share similar values, preferences and needs” 
(Hernandez and dos Santos, 2010).  
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4.4.9 The development of trust: 
 
The development of trust goes through different stages. The early stages “calculus - based 
trust is very partial and fragile”(Shapiro et. al., 1992)”6. After a while they receive more 
knowledge about each other and they learn as much as they can about each other’s behaviour. 
Because of this the mutual trust becomes less fragile and does not necessarily get broken by 
shifting behaviour. As time goes by they start developing identification - based trust. Before 
they experience that trust completely, they go through the knowledge - based trust phase, 
where they get to know each other. At the identification - based trust stage is developed when 
one “not only knows and predicts the others needs, choices and preferences but also shares 
them” (Shapiro et. al., 1992)”6. At this stage the parties know each other so well that they feel 
they are one entity. Although the relationship goes through these three stages, it does not 
mean that all relationships are able to develop to the last stage. Sometimes the relationship 
goes back, maybe from knowledge - based trust to calculus - based trust. “At any time, one 
party may have three different types of trust in different degrees towards his partner” 
(Lewicki and Bunker, 1995)
6
.  
 
4.5 Relationship theory with respect to inter-firm communication 
 
How should a business govern its exchanges with other businesses? To find out about this 
must be one of the main motivations behind the literature and research on the area of 
contracting and relationships. At least it is a challenge for most businesses to find the best 
possible solution to guard itself from opportunism or environmental uncertainties. Exchanges 
go on everywhere and everyday between businesses, how you govern they can be crucial to 
the well being of your business. There are substantial costs associated with a delivery or deal 
gone wrong, let’s say because of i.e. opportunism. How do we protect ourselves from 
something like that? 
 
4.5.1 Resource Dependence theory 
 
The idea that organizations is or can be totally independent of their environment is hard to 
imagine. Most organizations get their raw material from somewhere else. They are dependent 
on reputation to keep sales up, they have to adjust and listen to government or social groups 
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and so on. This facilitates the idea that organizations become interdependent with the 
elements of the environment they transact with. This is described well by Pfeffer (1992): 
“Because organizations are not internally self-sufficient, they require resources from the 
environment and, thus, become interdependent with those elements of the environment with 
which they transact.” (Pfeffer, 1992). Further on it is mentioned something that lies quite 
close to the topic of our assignment; “This interdependence can lead to the development of 
inter - organizational influence attempts.” (Pfeffer, 1992). 
 
Pfeffer and Salancik, as quoted in Pfeffer organizations (1992), he argues that three factors 
are important when it comes to whether or not an organization attempts to satisfy the demands 
of a given group: 1.Importance of the resource. 2. The extent to which the interest group has 
discretion over resource allocation and use. 3. The extent to which there are few alternatives. 
When two companies or organizations interact with one another in a relationship there will 
normally be differences between the parties. One of them will for instance have a long history 
and a lot of previously established customers, while the other one might for instance be a new 
emerging market participant. In such a relationship the older party probably will be less 
reliant on the newcomer because if the newcomer fails in the market, it will still have its 
original customers. In such a scenario it is interesting to talk about Power-Dependence.  
 
Power-Dependence relations were neatly described as being constituted of two dimensions by 
Emerson (1962). “One dimension being Dependence; “The dependence of actor A upon actor 
B is (1) directly proportional to A’s motivational investment in goals mediated by B, and (2) 
inversely proportional to the availability of those goals to A outside of the A-B relation.” 
(Emerson,1962). The second one is Power; “The power of actor A over actor B is the amount 
of resistance on the part of B which can be potentially overcome by A.”(Emerson,1962). 
These two dimensions are what build the Power-Dependence relation. Skewed alignment in 
this power-dependence is then a weakness or strength depending on what side of the scale the 
organization is. This is also easily applicable to our everyday observations in the market. If 
one company is in a monopoly situation, most companies in relation with it will become 
highly dependent upon their recourses. The proposition by Andersen and Nyhus (2009) then 
becomes very interesting; “P3: There is a negative relationship between the supplier’s 
dependence on the buyer and the probability that the seller uses blurring tactics (P3)” 
(Andersen and Nyhus, 2009).  
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From the proposition from Andersen and Nyhus (2009) came our next research question. 
 
Research Question 3D:  Is there a link between power-dependency and use of blurring? 
 
4.5.2 Relationship contracting theory  
 
Something else that is worth discussing when it comes to information sharing between 
organizations is relationship-contracting theory. It consists of a description of two types of 
contracts, one being the classical written one, and the other the relational one. They are both 
described fuller further down below. However, it is relationship contracting that is interesting 
for this thesis. There is more room for opportunism with relationship contracts than with 
classical contracts because classical contracts are more likely to be successfully taken to 
court. Despite this we still see some forms of blurring and opportunism with written contracts 
as well. But the majority is probably accounted for in relationship contracting. In this category 
it is often possible to behave opportunistically without breaking any written contract or law, 
thereby leaving the only thing on jeopardy the relationship itself. 
 
Classical contracts in their written formal form are weak in the sense that it cannot contain 
information about every possible happening or circumstance, as discussed earlier in the part 
with TCA. There will always be uncontrollable unforeseeable events that might occur. Until 
someone actually can tell the future, then this will be impossible to get protection from with a 
formal written contract. The contract would be unimaginable complex, and would have to 
describe every single event possible of taking place. Out of this we have gotten new thinking 
to the field, and research upon the subject called relationship theory. This is what takes place 
between two businesses upon exchange when no formal written contract is being formulated. 
There is mostly oral agreement, and the start of an ongoing process called a relational 
contract. ”Clearly, characteristic feature of a relationship is its duration over the long term, 
where the parties to the relationship depart from spot-market-determined exchanges” 
(Seshadri, 2004). 
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Another interesting thing is that when it comes to relational contracts, it is easy to believe that 
there must be a balance in power and dependency. But Kumar, Scheer and Steenkamp 
(1995b) found that even when there are asymmetries in the mentioned factors, firms still 
engage in relational contracts. This happens as long as the weaker firm perceives the stronger 
firm as fair. 
 
Opportunism is something that one time or another has tempted us all, it resembles for 
example the need for maximizing our own desires without thinking about long term 
consequences. In classical contracts there exists protection from these types of things, laws 
and the legal system. Breaking a written contract has consequences and is often easy to detect. 
On the other hand breaking some part of a relational contract might not be visible to the actors 
and therefore this type of contract must be based on, amongst other variables, trust. As 
Narayandas and Rangan (2004) hypothesize, interpersonal trust enhances inter-organizational 
commitment over time and high levels of trust and commitment can, in turn, neutralize the 
impact of initial power-dependence asymmetries (Narayandas and Rangan, 2004). 
Narayandas and Rangan (2004), believing that satisfactory performance and the subsequent 
development of trust and commitment are critical to successful relationship management, 
developed five important processes for establishing a good relationship: 
 
Leveraging Relative Position and Power to Define Initial Agreement Terms 
The powerful party will not formalize its position because it has other levers to protect itself. 
The weaker party needs to recognize and accept that a powerful firm will control a 
disproportionate amount of the initial available surplus. 
 
Evaluating Performance and converting it to Interpersonal Trust and Inter 
organizational Commitment 
Development of trust and commitment happen one episode at a time. Trust is built and 
maintained on the individual level and commitment is a broader organizational phenomenon. 
Actions inside the agreement are extremely important for building both trust between 
individuals and commitment between firms. Actions outside the agreement are important to 
jumpstart trust building between individuals. 
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Transferring Interpersonal Trust to Inter organizational Commitment 
Individuals who build trust with each other will transfer this bond to the firm level. 
 
Increasing Interpersonal Trust to Balance Initial Contract Terms 
A higher degree of interpersonal trust will motivate to fulfil the agreement, but also to step 
outside and help the other party in times of need. Such an action will again boost trust and 
commitment. The flipside is that for the person that has mistrust toward the other part will 
become less motivated to hold up his end of the deal, and the relation will deteriorate. 
 
Increasing Inter organizational Commitment to Balance Initial Power Asymmetries 
If the powerful party takes out a piece of the surplus, then the contract will be more equal in 
terms of power balance than before. This will become a virtuous circle, strengthening the 
relationship. On the other hand, the opposite might also happen, leading to a vicious circle 
where negotiations will be more and more difficult and one party ending up perceiving the 
other party’s demands as unreasonable. The relationship will eventually collapse. 
 
When addressing the work of Mohr & Spekman (1994) we see that among the important 
things of a healthy relationship are trust, the willingness to coordinate activities, and the 
ability to convey a sense of commitment to the relationship. Quality of information shared is 
also extremely important (Mohr & Spekman, 1994). 
 
However as important as trust seem to be when it comes to successful relationships, trust is 
also the first thing that is jeopardized when using blurring tactics. Thereby maybe the key 
component in the relationship is jeopardized and if discovered the relationship will probably 
end. This brings us to our next research question. 
 
Research Question 3E: Is there a negative relationship between perceived level of trust 
and degree of blurring tactics used in the relationship? 
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4.6 Decision-making 
 
We make decisions all the time in our day-to-day lives. Whether the question is what to have 
for dinner, or what colour to paint the children’s bedroom, or what car to buy, we have to 
come to a conclusion. At least as long as flipping a coin does not make the decision; we can 
say that cognitive functions are in play.  
 
Our cultural and humanly way of thinking has a lot to say when it comes to what decision is 
going to be made. As humans we rely on a lot of heuristics. Heuristics are shortcuts in ways 
of thinking that for the most times are pretty useful, but in some cases also leads to biases 
(Baron, 2008 p. 53). 
 
The work done by Amos, Tversky and Kahneman (1974) was the first to identify three major 
heuristics or “rules of thumb”. These three were anchoring, availability and 
representativeness. (Thaler and Sunstein, 2008). 
 
There has been developed a long list of possible heuristics and biases in the human cognition. 
However not all of them are relevant for the topic of blurring. Since blurring deals with 
interference with information passing for economical gain, we will try to suggest some of the 
ones we believe are more frequently exploited in the market than others. 
  
Anchoring effect (Baron p. 380, 2008 and Thaler & Sunstein, 2008 p. 23) 
This stems from the typical tendency for people to under adjust their guess away from an 
initial number that is given. Even when this number is random, people seem to under adjust 
away from it when submitting their own guess. In a negotiation process we can imagine that 
in example the sales person might introduce a market price for similar products as the one he 
wants to sell. And by presenting this price a little bit too high, try to anchor the purchaser as to 
giving an offer not adjusted enough away from this initial “number”. 
 
Availability heuristic (Thaler and Sunstein, 2008 p. 24) 
As humans we tend to consider things that recently have happened as more likely to happen 
again as supposed to if it had not happened recently. Then we tend to think that it is less likely 
to happen. What was for instance the chance of the volcano underneath Eyjafjallajökull 
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erupting in 2010? People will probably guess this to be higher now that it actually has 
happened, supposed to if they were asked about this in 2009. We can imagine several business 
areas that might try and exploit this cognitive shortcut, for instance the insurance business, by 
offering insurances playing with the fear of another eruption. An expensive insurance 
marketed against the airline companies? 
 
 
The Status Quo bias (Baron, 2008 p. 297; Thaler and Sunstein, 2008 p. 34). 
People tend to stick with their current situation longer than they might rationally like because 
of some inherent psychological resistance against change. Since inter-firm communication is 
primarily done between individuals, this bias like all the others is probably at work in 
business relations as well. This might be seen in several thought situations, in example where 
one firm sticks with a supplier despite having the opportunity to switch to another that would 
be cheaper, even when switching costs and every other cost is taken under consideration. 
 
Default bias (Baron, 2008 p. 299). 
When people have to make an active choice between alternatives, people tend to choose the 
default option more than other alternatives. This might be exploitable within business 
relations as suppliers could choose a product with higher than necessary price and quality as 
the default option, since purchasers often choose the default option.  
 
Evaluability bias (Baron, 2008 p. 294). 
People tend to evaluate options differently if the options are evaluated simultaneously, than if 
they were evaluated one at a time, with some time in between. This might typically be 
exploitable by offering two products with not too different production costs and pricing them 
out with a much higher price for the products with slightly better specifications. Typically 
people will tend to judge the product with higher specification as having a justified price, 
even though the relative difference in quality is not as large as the price difference.  
 
The sunk-cost effect (Baron, 2008 p. 305) 
If people already have put a lot of money/resources into a plan/investment then they will push 
forward even if they know that they will not make a profit, even at in example 80 percent 
completion. This is not rational because you could save money by walking away at 80 
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percent. This is typically a problem described in the transaction cost theory. Asset specificity 
deals with having spent a lot of resources/money on a relationship/product. Then the sunk-
cost effect might keep you from withdrawal even if it would be rational to do so. Typically we 
could imagine this happening in long term relationships, where terms of the initial agreement 
are not that good anymore. 
 
 
Framing effects (Thaler and Sunstein, 2008 p. 36). 
When given a lottery ticket winning statistic; 1% of buyers win something you will be more 
likely to buy than if you are confronted with that 99% of buyers don’t win. The setting in 
which you incorporate the “offering” has a lot to say. This might be just as much exploited in 
business-to-business relations as other areas. We imagine for instance offerings focusing on 
good aspects and downplaying the bad ones. Another probable event is salesmen trying to 
convince buyers through technical responsible people at the purchasing firm in order to win 
advantages with regards to technical specifications that are marginally better than competitor 
products.  
 
Another phenomena or tactic worth mentioning is the “rule of reciprocation”, which is a type 
of social interaction exploiting the feeling of obligation. This feeling to reciprocate a gift is 
very pervasive and is found to be a characteristic of most human culture (Cialdini, 2001). 
 
Why do we discuss these phenomena? Well, it is interesting to identify some of the 
exploitable cognitive functions. If we could be informed about these and come prepared to a 
meeting
8
, then we would be somewhat protected against opportunistic acts with regards to 
exploitation of this. There might also be other heuristics and biases being exploited in inter-
firm communication but for simplicity we will not elaborate on more than the above 
mentioned ones. 
 
 
 
                                                 
8. Meeting defined here as a meeting between two information exchanging firms where a potential deal is being 
negotiated. 
39 
 
4.6 Culture: 
 
Many companies in Norway do business in foreign countries, and need therefore to consider 
different cultures when they are making transactions with these countries. At times this can 
cause problems, because the cultures are so different from their own. If we only make 
decision based on our own country’s culture that will often lead to us making bad decisions 
(Internet 4, assessed 26.05.10, 20:23). 
 
“How a company configures its activities across borders is largely dependent on how it deals 
with the fundamental tension between the opposite demands of globalization and localization” 
(De Wit and Meyer, p. 535).  This means that the company is torn between the issue if they 
should produce one product for the whole world, or adapt it to the different cultures (De Wit 
and Meyer, p. 542).  We could write an entire thesis about this topic alone, but we do not 
think that it is as important for our topic and will therefore just mention it in this one 
paragraph.  
 
In order to analyse a countries culture, we can use Geert Hofstedes five cultural dimensions. 
These are: Power distance, individualism vs. collectivism, and masculinity vs. femininity, 
uncertainty avoidance and orientation. (Internet 3, assessed 25.05.10, 11:40).  
 
Power distance “is the extent to which the less powerful member of organizational and 
institutions (like the family) accept and expect that power is distributed unequally” (Internet 
4, assessed 25.05.10, 11:01). Here we divide between countries that have a small power 
distance (Denmark, Ireland) and countries that have a large power distance (Malaysia) 
(Internet 3, assessed 25.05.10, 11:08). In countries with low power distance there is more 
made more democratic decisions in organizations, people also get to consult in the decision, 
not just the people at the top. People are seen more as equals, not matter what formal position 
they have in the company. (Internet 3, assessed 25.05.10, “Subordinates are more comfortable 
with and demand the right to contribute to and critique the decisions of those in power” 
(Internet 3, assessed 25.05.10, 11:34). In countries with a large power distance the people 
with less power accept that fact and agree that there are people in the organization that makes 
most of the decisions (Internet 3, assessed 25.05.10, 11:37). “Subordinates acknowledge the 
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power of others based on their formal, hierarchical positions” (internet 3, assessed 25:05.10, 
11:38).  
 
Individualism vs. collectivism refers to “how much members of the culture define themselves 
apart from their group members” (Internet 3, assessed 25.05.10, 11:42). A country that is 
defined as being an individualistic culture, the people develops their own personalities and 
also decides which group they want to belong to (i.e. religion). This is a something that is 
expected from people, you are supposed to go your own way and not just follow the “herd”. 
(Internet 3, assessed 25.05.10, 11:45).  If a country is defined as being a collectivism culture, 
“the people are defined and act mostly as members of a long - term group, such as the family, 
a religious group, a town, a profession etc” (Internet 3, assessed 25.05.10, 11:47).   
 
In countries that are defined as being feminine, we find that people whom “value relationships 
and the quality of life” (Internet 3, assessed 25.05.10, 12:55).  The people want more long 
lasting relationships. While countries that are defined as masculine, the people here “value 
competitiveness, assertiveness, ambition” (Internet 3, assessed 25.05.10, 12:57).  They focus 
on earning a lot of money and also value the thought of owning a lot of material possessions. .  
 
Under uncertainty avoidance we find both weak and strong uncertainty avoidance. 
Uncertainty avoidance means “how much members of a society are anxious about the 
unknown, and as a consequence, attempt to cope with the anxiety by minimizing uncertainty” 
(internet 3, assessed 25.05.10, 13:07).  In cultures with strong uncertainty avoidance the 
people prefer explicit rules, for example about what food to eat, what religion to join and what 
is legal or illegal (Internet 3, assessed 25.05.10, 13:08).  In these cultures you also find that 
employees stay with the same employer for a long time. In cultures with weak uncertainty 
avoidance the people like “flexible or implicit rules or guidelines” (Internet 3, assessed 
25.05.10, 13:15).  Compared to a culture with strong uncertainty avoidance, the people here 
prefer informal activities. They also do not stay with the same employer as long as they do in 
a culture with strong uncertainty avoidance; the employees often change their work place. 
 
Orientation can be divided into long - term and short - term orientation. A definition here is “a 
societies time horizon, or the importance attached to the future versus the past and the 
present” (internet 3, assessed 25.05.10, 13:21).  In cultures which are defined as being long - 
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term, the people “value actions and attitudes that affects the future” (internet 3, assessed 
25.05.10, 13:34).  They focus on saving money and perseverance. In cultures that are defined 
as being short term, the people “value actions and attitudes that are affected by the past or the 
present: normative statements, immediate stability, protecting one’s own face, respect for 
tradition and the reciprocation of greetings, favours and gifts” (internet 3, assessed 25.05.10, 
13:36).   
 
These dimensions will affect how a company will do business in different countries, 
especially if the countries cultures differ. A company needs to consider these differences, and 
at times adapt to them. By using these dimensions we get “an insight into other cultures so 
that we can be more effective when interacting with people in other countries” (Internet 4, 
assessed 26.05.10, 20:26).  
 
We decided to write a research question to find out if there is a link between a foreign culture 
and the use of blurring tactics.  
 
Research Question 3C: Is there a positive association between cultural distance and the 
use of blurring tactics? 
5. Method 
 
A master thesis calls for a thorough methodological understanding in order to be as valid as 
possible. Thereby we had to keep this in mind while doing theory gathering and interviews.  
 
Our first step in this assignment was to gather theoretical foundations to further build our 
thesis upon. We also needed to develop research questions and a goal for our assignment. Our 
focal phenomenon, blurring, is a relatively new theoretical construct. Even though it is related 
to opportunism, there is not a lot of research to find about it. Given this precondition, our 
angle of approach had to be of exploratory nature. A quantitative study without knowing if 
this is considered a common phenomenon in real life amongst business actors in the market 
would be to throw a rock in the dark. Therefore we had to approach this with a qualitative 
study to begin with. To approach this with a two-phased plan would have been great. We 
could have started up with a qualitative study and followed up with a quantitative study. But 
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given the time restraints on this master thesis, we had to restrict to doing the qualitative study 
first, and let others follow up with the quantitative study.  
 
Our next step was to find firms willing to give a one-time interview. We have to give thanks 
once again to Gøril Hannås for letting us give a short presentation of our assignment in her 
class consisting of business people from the Vest-Agder district. This gave us a great 
opportunity to get contact information to possible interviewees. Further on some additional 
telephone rounds resulted in some further interviewees. 
 
Going on with the process, the next thing to do was to create an interview guide to assist us in 
interviewing and to be a basis for mail development, for an e-mail being sent to candidates for 
them to get somewhat prepared for the interview. In this e-mail we presented the candidate for 
what the interview was about and the direction it would take. We gave information about that 
we wanted to know more about their relations, long-term and short-term. We informed that 
we wanted to know a little bit about the people making up the relationship, frequency of 
communication and frequency of exchange. We also talked a little bit about blurring and how 
it differs from opportunism, in the way that it deals with information distortion and 
information blocking. Finally we were very clear on the fact that everything was treated 
confidential and anonymous. 
 
We tried to separate the different interviewee candidates into different categories. In fact most 
of them are representatives of the purchasing function in the respectable firms. We have got 4 
with purchasing related experiences, and 1 representative from sales and 3 representatives 
from both categories. 
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Interviewees Purchasing Sales 
A X X 
B X  
C X X 
D X  
E X  
F  X 
G X  
H X X 
 
Table 1:  Experience distribution  
 
This distribution of different experience basis gave us reason to prepare for the different 
interviews with different approaches. This leads up to the development of a more detailed 
interview guide and start preparing for the interviews, which ended up with scheduling and 
executing the interviews. 
 
Interview candidates were randomized and given codes as shown in table 1 above. This was 
done to ensure total anonymity and confidentiality for the interviewees. The randomization 
makes sure that the order of appearance has no correlation with either time or other variables 
of the process of writing the thesis.  
 
One planned interviewee withdrew from the interview when he found out what it was about. 
This is sensitive matters, and we feel this describes that pretty well. Not everyone wants to 
expel sensitive information like this, reasonably so. 
 
5.1 Qualitative interviews 
 
By choosing a qualitative interview, we open the window for getting a more in-depth 
understanding of inter-firm communication, processes, phenomena and forms of blurring 
occurring in relationships between firms. In order to get as much information as possible, we 
chose semi-structured qualitative interview to be our way of approach. Since our field of 
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interest contains allot of specific information and constructs, we chose to, as mentioned, hand 
out a rough layout of the interview in advance by e-mail. This way we could ensure an 
efficient interview with regards to straightforward information and a more streamlined 
progress of interviewing. Further on, the topic of interest might be subjected to a cognitive 
phenomenon of not recalling incidents dated a bit back in time. Giving interviewees chance to 
gather thoughts and memories in advance was thought to increase the value of each interview. 
 
In our preparation for the interview we were aware of our potential influence on the 
interviewee. Presentation, clothing choices and so on are important, so we adapted in such a 
way, that the influence on the interviewee hopefully was kept to a minimum. As presented by 
Esterberg (2002): ”Because interviews are relationships between two (or more) persons, 
however artificial it might feel, social skills are crucial in regards to how good an interviewer 
you are. If the candidate do not trust you, or is discomforted in your presence, then the 
interview will probably go bad.” (Esterberg, 2002 p.91). 
 
By making the questions too strict, we would put us in risk of not obtaining valuable 
information. The questions were of course open ended, to avoid the interviewee answering 
something that is only similar to the truth. This way we would also ensure that the interviewee 
gets the opportunity to fill in on subjects that we might overlook. To have too high specificity 
in the interview questions you run the risk of passing by valuable information. Consider an 
example; getting the question: “What is your favourite fruit? Apples, bananas or oranges?” 
What do you reply if your favourite fruit is kiwi? Leading questions like this one illustrates, 
was avoided as much as possible. 
 
Our ideal situation was thought to be one where the interviewee openly expelled experience 
and knowledge of the phenomenon of blurring. 
 
We are handling a delicate phenomenon when it comes to how this information obtained can 
potentially harm each business and interviewee. Therefore it was important for us to apply 
just an appropriate amount of steering on the interview. Of course, on occasion, we had to 
apply techniques, such as oral assurances (“remember that this interview is totally 
anonymous”); while on other occasions the interviewee trusted us sufficiently enough to 
singlehandedly reveal sensitive information of great value to us. Further on we tried to use 
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vocal encouragement methods when we wanted to progress into specific areas of interest. 
Primarily, by using the Norwegian language to encourage the respondents. We also wanted to 
not take too much control of the interview because of running the risk of influencing both the 
interviewee and ourselves. We did not want to influence them into answering in a special 
way, but wanted them to speak as openly as possible. By doing a semi-structured interview 
you run the risk of influencing in this way, therefore it gets increasingly important to be aware 
of these things. Adjustments had to be made according to each candidate’s personality to 
ensure a neutral and good chemistry between interviewer and interviewee. As mentioned 
earlier the subject being studied is of sensitive matter, and might on occasion cross ethical 
lines and even the law itself. Therefore it was very important of us to not act in a way that 
might imply moral judgement or other provoking thoughts from our side. 
 
Few of our respondents were not situated located, and we therefore had to use a telephone 
interview with these respondents. The ideal situation would be to travel to their offices and 
interview them there, but time and money restricted us from doing so. During the interview 
one of us took the lead and asked the questions, while the other one listened in and took notes. 
This type of interview worked well enough, but we did miss the effect personal interaction 
has on a respondent.  
 
The telephone interviews were usually lasted less than the face - face interviews. This could 
be because it was more so called small talk in the face - to face interview, while the telephone 
interview went straight to the topic and interview.  
 
5.2 Analysing results 
 
The final step of this thesis was to analyse our results. We tried to organize different 
relationships and blurring examples into different categories. In this way it would be easier to 
see impacts of blurring on different properties of the different relationships. We made some 
tables to get a better view of impacts of relationship attributes on the subject of blurring. 
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5.3 Potential weaknesses in our qualitative study 
 
One weakness regarding our interviews is the lack of recording devices. We made the 
decision to purely note down the whole interview (or at least as much as possible) by hand. 
This method is subject to validity issues because it relies on memory and interpretation of 
notes. While doing it this way, it was increasingly important to get to write down the whole 
interview in retrospect, as soon as possible. This is to try to avoid your own cognitive 
functions to bias and influence what you remember of the interview. Using a recording device 
would have been better when reviewing the pure technical aspects of conducting these 
interviews. But again, when handling such a delicate matter, touching and crossing boundaries 
of moral and at times law itself. It is important to keep in mind that using such a recording 
device might induce a discomforting feeling in the interviewee thereby constricting the 
information revealed. 
 
A challenge in our thesis is that well-established long-term relationships with a good history 
normally do not show any evidence of blurring tactics taking place. This would be 
counterintuitive and the relationship would probably no longer exist. Therefore to examine 
this phenomenon in ongoing relationships probably will invite difficulties. If a spokesman 
responds positively on that they currently are undergoing challenges with regards to a relation 
using blurring tactics in meeting with them, then he would also admit a large problem with 
that relationship and it would probably rapidly deteriorate. Of course it is possible to 
overcome such relationships at any given time, but the chance that it already is deteriorated is 
large. Thereby we most of the time rely on the memory of interview candidates. So by 
focusing a bit more on historic relationships there might be a bit larger opening for such 
information to reach the surface of our thesis. 
 
We experienced what made out to be quite a time consuming task of getting interviewee 
candidates and executing the interviews. First of all, the number of interviewees is a bit low. It 
would have been better if we could have gotten more interview candidates. This way we 
could have gotten a better view of differences between purchasing and sales, better 
understanding of different sorts of relationships. It would have been easier to draw indicatives 
with a higher degree of validity with more respondents. We might have gotten more examples 
of blurring tactics. 
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6. Results: 
 
Our respondents came from companies located in Kristansand, Oslo and Stavanger. We also 
interviewed a faculty member at the University of Agder, because of his experience with 
construction companies and the knowledge he had acquired from this work.  
The companies varied in size, all from being large international companies to small 
Norwegian companies. One of the companies our respondent came from, were a consulting 
company and another one a sale company. However, most of our companies were industrial 
companies. The relationships in our study consist of mostly what’s named by DeWit and 
Meyer (2004) as being Upstream or Downstream vertical relations. The relationships consists 
of a vertical assessment of the value chain, normally in our findings they were purchaser – 
seller relationships. 
 
Interviewee Gender Age Industry Job/title Size of 
firm 
Relations 
A Male 50 – 60 Consulting CEO Small Vertical 
B Male 50 – 60 Industrial Purchasing 
manager 
Large Vertical 
C Male 30 – 45 Industrial Purchasing 
manager  
Large Vertical 
D Male 50 – 60 Industrial Purchasing 
manager 
Large Vertical 
E Male 50 – 60 Construction Project 
Manager 
Large Vertical 
F Male 50 – 60 Industrial Sales 
Manager 
Large Vertical 
G Female 40 – 50 Oil and Gas Purchasing 
Manager 
Large Vertical 
H Male 30 – 40 Supply CEO Small Vertical 
I* Female 50 – 60 Industrial Sales 
Manager 
Large Vertical 
Table 2 Interviewee information 
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*Interviewee I participated in the interviewee we had with interviewee F. But we were not 
able to separate the two entities in the interview, therefore decided we to treat the two 
interviewees as one person.  
 
Because the concept is so new, neither of the respondents had heard about the concept. 
Therefore we started each interview with explaining the concept. We explained blurring 
tactics by saying that it is about hindering information that you do not wish to share with your 
relations. Further on we told them that it looks somewhat similar to opportunism. But that 
blurring separates itself from opportunism by dealing with information blocking and 
distortion, and not by observable actions. For instance we also tried to explain the 
phenomenon in different ways by translating the word blurring to Norwegian, or giving them 
a general example. 
6.1 Degree of blurring in business relationships 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 3:  Blurring in business relationships  
 
We can see that 1 replied the answer “little” while the other 7 gave the answer “a lot”. That 
gives us a spread with 12,5% of the respondents answering “little”, and 87,5% answering “a 
lot”.  
 
Most of our respondents felt that their exchange partners commonly use blurring tactic in their 
business relationships; actually almost every one of them felt that it was used a lot in business 
relationships.  
 A lot Little 
Interviewee A X  
Interviewee B X  
Interviewee C X  
Interviewee D X  
Interviewee E X  
Interviewee F X  
Interviewee G  X 
Interviewee H X  
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Interviewee G felt that blurring tactics was not commonly used in business relationships. She 
was the only one of our respondents who felt that way. She had never heard any stories from 
other people, and had even talked to her colleagues to see if they had some experience with 
blurring. She got the same feedback from her colleagues; they could not see that it was 
common in the business world. She did mention that she could not be sure that this never 
happens, but could not remember if she, herself, had experienced it.  
 
All the other respondents believed differently, they believed that blurring tactics is normal 
behaviour, and most of them could tell us stories about tactics they had used themselves or 
others had used.  
 
Examples of this to further illustrate: 
 
Interviewee D and F talked about a tactic they use, where they try to blur who actually has the 
right to make the decisions.  
 
Example D1: 
Interviewee F said that they at times blamed the slow decision process on that it was the 
board’s decision; therefore they had to wait for them.  
Example D2: Interviewee D said that they try to cloud the information about who has the right 
to make the decision, it could be them, but they try to make it look like it was not their 
decision.  
 
Most of our respondents strongly believed that blurring was very normal in the business 
world, and that most people have used it at one point in time.  
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6.3 Degree of blurring in our sample’s relationships. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 3: Blurring in their business - business relationships 
 
Here we observe a spread throughout our sample with a 50/50 distribution. 
 
With this question we got very diverse responses, quite the opposite of what we got in 
research question 1A. Half of our respondents felt that blurring tactics was commonly being 
used in their own business-to-business relationships and half did not think that these tactics 
was very common in their own relations. They did not say that it doesn’t happen elsewhere, 
the meant it could and does happen, but it was not common in their own relationships. The 
other half felt that is was normal practice in their relations, and a way to get ahead, 
competition-wise.  
 
Interviewee G, who felt that blurring tactics was not common in the business world, also did 
not think that it was common in their own relations. This respondent felt that their company 
had long lasting trusting relationships, where they did not use these sorts of tactics. They also 
only had one possible choice in several suppliers, which meant that there was no point in 
trying to “trick” them in to thinking that they had more choices. The suppliers knew that they 
were their only choice, and so they focused on being open with them and the respondent said 
this lead to a power balance between them. The respondents believed that the company’s 
focus on ethics stopped them from using too much blurring tactics. 
 
 A lot Little 
Interviewee A  X 
Interviewee B X  
Interviewee C X  
Interviewee D  X 
Interviewee E  X 
Interviewee F X  
Interviewee G  X 
Interviewee H X  
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Interviewee B and C did mention that a few of the tactics or all could be seen as being on the 
border to unethical, but it was not many of the tactics they felt bad about using. These tactics 
were just something that you needed to be a part of. However some of the tactics is crossing 
the border of legal activities and for instance interviewee B reported that he did not feel 
comfortable using the tactic where they manufactured fake offers in order to get a better deal.  
 
Most of the respondents were able to tell us stories where they believed they were using 
blurring tactics, and could also tell stories about other people, colleges or business partners.  
 
Respondents A and E said it was the industry they where inn, which was the reason why they 
did not experience much blurring tactics. Interviewee E`s industry was the contracting 
industry, and this respondent “blamed” the law, which hindered people in using such tactics. 
This industry has had problems before, and because of this they have developed very efficient 
laws in order to control the industry. Opportunism happen, but he did not feel blurring was as 
common in his industry.  
 
Interviewee A said that he was not in an industry where they needed such tactics. He was part 
of a consultant firm, and here there was no room or need for blurring tactics. But he did know 
much about blurring from his clients, and had therefore valuable knowledge for us. 
 
Interviewee D, who did not feel that there was a lot of blurring in their own relations, said that 
their firm was focused on being open with their relations. Nevertheless he did mention some 
part of the negotiation process where they were not as open, in example when they where 
asked to mention names of who had the right to make the decision. This is something that 
they normally do not know, they do not reveal who has the decision power when making a 
deal.  
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6.4 Type of knowledge/information blurred and how 
 
 
Table 4: Content and Form  
 
As we can see from this table, information that gets blurred varies from price to decision 
making.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Category Content Form 
A Profit-margin Agent not informed of profit 
margins, Saying that this is as 
low as they can go (final 
price).  
B Number of competitors/ Power 
dependency 
Forging offers from suppliers, 
giving hints that they have 
more to choose from. 
Pretending that more suppliers 
actually fit specifications than 
actually is the case. 
C Total cost Main price with extra costs 
(extra cost bias?), Elevator 
operators with low price but 
high service cost.  
D Decision maker Not revealing who has the final 
decision making responsibility  
E Blurring of economical goals Rule of reciprocation 
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Table 5: Form and Interviewee 
 
Table 5 shows which one, of the interviewees, believes that certain information often gets 
blurred.  
 
Example C1: Interviewee A and F believed that extra cost was information that could easily 
be blurred, both by themselves and their relations. Interviewee F said that they usually set a 
price for a product, but blurred the information about all the extra cost it will take to get the 
best possible product. They started with focusing on the starting - main price, but ended up 
recommending several upgrades and changes.  
 
Example C2: Elevators 
Interviewee A mentioned an example with elevator suppliers. He said that they have the 
possibility to sell the elevator at a low price, because they can charge more for service on the 
Form Interviewee 
Agent not informed of profit margins, 
Saying that this is as low as they can 
go (final price).  
Interviewee E and B 
Forging offers from suppliers, giving 
hints that they have more to choose 
from  
Pretending that more suppliers actually 
fit specifications than actually is the 
case  
Interviewee H, C, B 
Interviewee D, G and A 
Main price with extra costs (extra cost 
bias?), Elevator operators with low 
price but high service cost.  
Interviewee A and F 
Not revealing who has the final 
decision making responsibility  
Interviewee B, D and F 
Rule of reciprocation, blurring that the 
real goal is to get a sale by offering 
gifts or similar. 
Interviewee H 
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elevators in the future. He said that the most important thing for an elevator company is to get 
the elevator in to a building; they can do this by lowering the initial price. After the elevator is 
installed, the owner will turn to the elevator company for service. Here do they not have to 
lower the price. The respondents company had done a survey about this topic, and discovered 
that most of an elevator company’s revenue comes from service on existing elevators.  
 
Interviewee B, D and F also thought that the information about who has the decision right is 
also something that often gets blurred.  
 
Example D3: Interviewee B said that they often blurred the purchasing process by pretending 
that they had to go by the management, before accepting an offer. This was done in order to 
get the price that they wanted. They would say that “we of course would not mind accepting 
the price, but that the manager will not let me go over this figure”. 
 
Example D4: Interviewee F said that they often hide behind “company policy”, to make the 
other part give in and take the deal they want. They also often put an “escape hatch” into a 
contract. This is a part in the contract, which says that they will need approval from the board 
of directors before they can go through with the deal. This way they are able to back off from 
the deal, if they change their mind later. 
 
Example B1: Faking offers was a tactic that several of our respondents reported as a common 
tactic to use. Information about where the company stands, when it comes to power in the 
relationship, was very common to blur. Interviewee H, C and B admitted to using such a 
tactic, and felt that it was a pretty common. They would use this to get a better position in a 
negotiating process with a firm, if they actually only have one supplier, they would try to hide 
this information from the suppliers. This way they could be able to get a better deal, than they 
would if the supplier knew they had more power and were in a better position.  
 
Example E1: Interviewee H could tell us about a very frequent use of “the rule of 
reciprocation”. He had very good experiences with this as it seemed to increase sales with a 
lot. He gave us an example of if one sale-representative goes out to meet 10 potential 
customers without bringing a gift; he might end up with as few as 3 sales. But if he brings a 
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gift, and presents it in advance of the selling-process he has experience with normally ending 
up with twice as many. 
 
6.5 Under what circumstances is blurring likely to be used?  
 
We have discovered information about several areas where blurring are more likely to be 
used. We try to address them one dimension at a time by visiting further research question 
following in order below. 
 
6.5.1 Asset specificity and blurring 
 
One of the respondents, interviewee B did mention that they try to work close with one of 
their partners to help them develop their products better. They bought their product, made a 
good contract and let them go without the problem of competition for a period. By doing it 
this way they can concentrate on developing the product, making it even better. In the end 
they would get to buy an even better developed product for their own company. As far as we 
know, neither part invested anything special into this relationship, except for time. They could 
have tried to find a better company to work with, but chose to help this company out. If the 
company they “helped out” decided to cheat its partner, than the firm would loose the time 
devoted to the relationship, time they could have spent working with another company.  
 
None of the other respondents mentioned anything about investing in their partners, and 
therefore none of them mentioned asset specificity. Most of them kept their exchange partners 
at an arm’s length, and they did not invest much into the relationships. Most of them had long 
lasting functional relationships, but there were never mentioned investments into these 
relationships, other than time that is.  
 
Because of this we are not able to answer this research question properly, since we do not 
have enough information from our respondents. This might partly be due to a general lack of 
firms applying asset specific investments in their relationships in Kristiansand, or it might be 
due to our sample consisting mostly of vertical purchaser - seller relationships. 
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6.5.2 Relationship length and blurring 
 
Several of our respondents mentioned that they had quite a few relationships, which they have 
had for a long time.  
 
In what type of relationships is blurring most often believed to appear? 
Candidates Long-term Short-term N/A 
Interviewee A  X  
Interviewee B  X  
Interviewee C  X  
Interviewee D  X  
Interviewee E  X  
Interviewee F  X  
Interviewee G   X 
Interviewee H  X  
Table 6: Blurring in short term or long term relationships.  
 
Nearly all of our respondents answered “Short-Term” which gives us a spread of 87,5% 
voting “Short-Term”, and 12,5% voting “N/A”. 
 
Interviewee H mentioned one relationship that they have had since the 1990`s. This 
respondent felt that the longer the relationship lasts, the better the relationship would be. He 
said that the longer the relationship lasts, the more trust will be developed between the parties 
and that will in the end lead to a more stabile relation. But the public sector is not allowed to 
use the same partners over again. This restriction does not apply to the private sector; here 
they can stay in a relationship for as long as they want. The respondent said that it is common 
for some of the private actors to stay in long-term relationships with its suppliers. “Some 
people believe that the public sector should also be allowed to establish long - term 
relationships like they have in the private sector. Because then they are able to build effective 
networks.” - Interviewee H 
 
Most of our respondents had the opinion that with their long - term relationship it was less 
blurring involved, and they also said that they thought there were more blurring in short term 
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relationships. One of our respondents said that he thought that it is easier to divulge 
information they might not want the other part to know, in short - term relationships. Sooner 
or later in a long - term relationship your partner will find out if you have used any blurring 
tactics and that could end up with the relationship being terminated.    
 
One of the respondents, interviewee C, said that they keep their less important relationships 
on an “arms length”, these are relationship they can easily replace. But the more important 
relationships, which they cannot easily replace, are kept closer. Another respondent, 
interviewee H said that he felt it was important with mutual respect in long - term 
relationships, so it wouldn’t be so tempting to use blurring tactics.  
 
Most of our respondents think that it is important to keep functional and successful long - 
term relationships and that it is a bad idea to use blurring tactics in these relationship. They 
felt it is too important to take a risk with such tactics, because there is always a chance of 
getting caught. Another respondent, interviewee H said that they used a lot of blurring tactics 
when it came to new customers; he also mentioned that this was especially normal with 
customers they were not dependent on. If they had a large customer, who gave them a lot of 
business, they would not try to use as many blurring tactics, as they would if the customer 
were smaller and less important. He did mention that they have to work hard to get customers, 
because they have large, international companies, to compete against.  
 
6.5.3 Cultural distance and blurring 
 
The majority of our respondents did do business with foreign companies, the countries varied 
with many countries, for instance Brazil and the Netherlands.  
 
All the respondents, who already claimed that blurring existed in the Norwegian market, 
meant that it also exists in foreign market. Some even believed that it could be worse in some 
foreign countries. 
 
Interviewee F mentioned that in some of the cultures they have experienced it is important to 
get to know the people you collaborate with, it is important to have a relationship with them. 
58 
 
This relationship could be more than just a business relationship; it could be a more personal 
relationship. In some cultures they want to get to know the people before they start working 
with them. The same respondent also mentioned that at times they look passed cases that 
would break Norwegian regulations, just because it is easier. Because if they meddle, they 
would be part of the whole situation, and it is simplest to just look passed it.  
 
Interviewee F also said that in some cultures, they are very dependent on having so called 
“door openers” which are people or organizations that help them break in to that country’s 
market. People, who know the culture, know how it works and what they can and cannot do. 
Some countries are too difficult to enter with out any local help. This company has done some 
work with relations from Brazil, and experienced that if they wanted something done they had 
to pay for it. The bureaucracy in the country caused a lot of problems for the company.  
 
Interviewee B mentioned that in some cultures/countries the people were very good at 
pretending they were offended when they start talking about the price. This is a tactic they use 
in order to get the price that they want. The same respondent said that people in Germany are 
very concerned with title and interested in who is actually in charge. This is of course 
something they have to consider, when they are negotiating a deal with a German firm.  
 
What we found information about in our interviews is that several of our respondent felt that 
blurring tactics are being used in other cultures. They could not tell us any examples of 
blurring tactics; although they did have a lot of examples about opportunistic behaviour. Still, 
they were sure that the use of blurring tactics was not something we only found in the 
Norwegian market. They did not see any reason why Norwegian suppliers, costumers etc 
would be less honest than international ones.  
 
Interviewee C mentioned an experience from China, one of many similar incidents when 
travelling around the world. When the HSE – Health Safety and Environment – management 
representatives came to overlook the Chinese factory, they were going to overlook the whole 
factory in normal activity. When entering one of the departments, that normally should 
occupy 80 men, no one was at work at that time. In addition everything was very neat and 
tidy, something that must be contrary to a normal day in full activity. This was done to create 
better picture of standards, than what was real. 
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6.5.4 Power-Dependency 
 
Purchasing related examples: 
Example B2: As our Interviewee D said: “Our main focus is to establish a situation in which it 
seems as though there is a high degree of competition between suppliers, even though this 
might not be the case”. Information about the power-dependency upon the focal supplier is 
thereby blurred. 
 
Example B3: Another one of our interviewee’s, candidate D, can tell us that buyers who are 
facing a lot of different suppliers usually behave more opportunistically. They often pretend 
that they are going to be faithful buyers even though they easily change supplier upon a better 
offering. They have themselves experienced this. 
 
Example B4: Interviewee B reports that they too try to blur information about how dependent 
they are at times, when sitting in a negotiation meeting with suppliers. They tend to construct 
an image as if they are not dependent on the supplier at all, that they just as easily can pick 
another supplier even though no such other supplier exists. They might create fictional 
offerings by manufacturing papers and deliberately letting them sticking out of a folder, so 
that the supplier will see it and get a feeling that they have to give them a good offer/price. 
Another example of power-dependency blurring this interviewee was practicing was 
pretending that real suppliers were able to deliver what they demanded, even though they 
were slightly out of the specification range. 
 
First of all interviewee B told us that he firmly believes there is a connection between how 
dependent a firm is on another, and if it will use blurring tactics. He believes there is more 
blurring from a part that is not that reliant on the other part of the relationship. This 
interviewee B also reported a good example of power-dependency related blurring from a 
supplier:  
 
Example B5: 
A Norwegian supplier told buyers that they were a monopolist supplier of this good. They 
were the only one in the world that could deliver these goods. The prices that interviewee B 
had to pay seemed very high, despite information from the supplier tried to persuade them 
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that this was not the case. Interviewee B’s company began to search for alternative suppliers 
and found one capable of delivery in another country. Thereby it was possible, without 
information distortion/blocking, to create an image of competition in the market. As a 
consequence the prices fell with 40% from the existing supplier. This is an example of 
opportunism in the form of overpricing. However, they supplier were blurring their position in 
the market. They were in fact not a sole supplier. There were alternatives suppliers available 
in the market, besides them. 
 
The buying company then faced a dilemma, should they stick with the previous long-term 
relationship in spite of the opportunistic behaviour they had shown? Or should they switch to 
the new one? They changed to the new supplier, partly in retaliation to the former and partly 
to strengthen what seemed to be a more honest supplier. What happened later on was that the 
new company failed to deliver; they had been blurring their capacity for deliverance. 
Interviewee B’s company never got any information about deliveries going to be delayed, 
they just suddenly were.  
 
Sales related examples:  
Example B6: One of our respondents, interviewee F, has met dependency-blurring in 
negotiating processes as a seller. Normally it would be very difficult for a supplier to know 
whether buyers manufacture false offers or if the ones presented in reality are valid. In this 
one case they were going to a negotiation meeting in another country and they got knowledge 
from secure sources in advance, that some suppliers wouldn’t be able to deliver (there 
shouldn’t be any offers from these competitors), but despite this, there suddenly were offers 
from these suppliers presented in the meeting. Then they knew that they were blurring their 
dependency of getting the deal with interviewee F’s firm. 
 
6.5.5 Trust and blurring tactics 
 
Interviewee B said that in the Norwegian market there was little price-collaboration, because 
the Norwegian market is small, and the companies know each other, therefore this also 
involves trust. 
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Interviewee H: “The longer the relationship lasts, the better it gets and more trust is developed 
between the parties. These relationships, in the end turn out to be a more stable relationship.” 
 
6.5.6 Judgemental errors and biases 
 
We draw on literature about judgment, human cognition, and decision-making with biases, 
and try to identify some biases in our material/findings. 
 
Status Quo Bias: 
We see indications about the status quo bias being exploited in several of our studied 
relationships. 
 
Status Quo bias was observed by 5 out of 8 respondents, giving us a spread of 62,5% having 
observed it on at least one occasion. While 37,5% did not have any experiences about it. 
 
Interviewee B seemed to experience attempts to exploit the status quo bias when he realized 
that prices were unnaturally high with his old relationship. The prices were not adjusted until 
they put a competitor’s offer on the table in meeting with the old supplier.  
 
Example SQ1: Our interview candidate A also was familiar with that people oppose change. 
And that exploitation of this status quo bias was fairly regularly exploited in the market. 
Many firms had a weak purchasing strategy in the sense that they too seldom went out into the 
market to search for alternative suppliers. He/she described an example known in the 
insurance business. A practice until recently, though still might exist, have been to treat 
existing customers differently than new customers. Customers who frequently change 
insurance company find the bonuses constantly increasing, while a faithful customer 
experiences a lower increment in bonus. This is relevant for both the private market and 
business-to-business exchanges. This is typically exploitation of the status quo bias because 
the insurance companies speculate in the cognitive error that makes us devoted to sticking 
with our already established insurer. “It’s the same with banking; new customers often get 
better terms than long-term faithful customers that don’t threaten with changing banks.” He 
told us. 
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Example SQ2: Another example given by interviewee C: is that some car manufacturers are 
known to change relationship managers every so and so year, to protection against such biases 
amongst others. They don’t want a situation where they end up sticking with a provider just 
because they have used them before. With new relationship managers so and so often, they 
can evaluate current relationships with fresh eyes each time. 
 
Interviewee G has established a protection against this bias with setting the deals out on new 
negotiations every five years. This is to open up for new suppliers getting a chance, and to 
make the supplier less prone to try and exploit the status quo bias. 
 
Interviewee D has a similar approach to keep from getting caught up in the status quo bias. 
They practice renegotiations every third year. 
 
Default Bias:  
Our Interviewee H seems to have experiences with the default bias both when it comes to 
purchasing and sales. Further on he says this kind of tactics is an established practice in 
vertical purchasing-seller relationships. The default bias is exploited in both long-term and 
short-term relationships, maybe to a slightly more profound degree in short-term 
relationships. It is clearly seen when it comes to purchase sizes.  
 
Example DB1, from purchasing: 
Standard quanta are presented to purchasers, and it is not clearly stated if it is possible to 
deviate from these standard quanta, even though it really is. According to Interviewee H’s 
experience that is. When the relationship gets older, then opportunities to adjust packages to 
own liking present themselves. 
 
Example DB2, from selling: 
Interviewee H practices many of the same tactics when selling as he is presented for when 
purchasing. He offers standard packages without any room for negotiation and set the default 
quanta’s as being an above medium package. In addition the default is set to be products with 
a good profit margin as opposed to the ones most reasonable for the customers. Interviewee H 
deals mostly with short-term customers. He says that long-term customers are allowed more 
insight and adjustability when it comes to such orders. With new customers an established 
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practice is to offer standard packages, and purposely not inform of other products or quanta 
unless they ask.  
 
Evaluability Bias:  
We found that several of our interviewee’s had examples of being tried exploited when it 
comes to this. 
 
Example EB1: Interviewee A describes a situation with a potential long-term supplier where 
the supplier had to choose between different types of paper products. They were given 
information about the product at one time. When choosing which one to buy, additional 
information came into the process, thereby giving them less chance to evaluate the terms on a 
well thought through level. The specification about the product was so advanced; there were 
many price elements on one product, that it was impossible for an outsider to keep eye on 
total costs and to evaluate alternatives. They blurred information about total costs by 
exploiting the evaluability bias.  
 
Interviewee A also describes a situation in which purchases have become more and more 
advanced over time. There are less of the easy-to-compare products nowadays than it was 
some time ago. 
 
Example EB2: Interviewee candidate B can tell us about what is a common practice among 
suppliers when trying to secure a deal. They seek to get the technical community in the 
buying firm to support their product. They try to do this partly with the availability bias, by 
making products less comparable to others, but also with a pure opportunistic act by 
establishing good relationships with the technical decision maker, if they can identify such a 
person. 
 
Framing effects: 
 
Sales representatives:  
Example Framing1: Our interviewee F tells us about a tactic they use upon sales to new and 
existing customers. They consequently emphasize the good aspects of their products, and 
downplay the less good qualities. They also tell us about often try to get in contact with the 
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technical representatives of the other firm, so they can use framing effects in such a way that 
technical qualities about their products will win over the economical ones. 
 
7. Discussion 
 
We first of all would like to acknowledge weaknesses about the size of the data pool. But as 
we discovered during our period writing this thesis, gathering willing candidates and 
executing in-depth interviews are rather time consuming affairs. However, we got a hold of a 
small but good sample, consisting of mostly purchasing managers, but many of them had 
experiences with other areas of business, such as sales, as well. 
 
Our sample was made up, as shown in Table 1 and Table 2, with businesses that had mostly 
vertical aligned relationships, and most often purchasing-selling relationships. This is perhaps 
both because of the positions the different candidates had and maybe also because these are 
the relationships that might have the highest frequency of interaction. It is also quite 
understandable that our sample will influence the findings in our following research 
questions. Clearly our sample is no representative of the market as a whole, but maybe it can 
be a closer to representation of vertical purchaser-seller relationships. 
 
Research Question 1 A: To what degree does the exchange partner believe that blurring 
tactics are commonly used in business relationships?  
As we can see from the findings in Table 3 most of the interviewees answer that they believe 
use of blurring tactics in business relationships are very common. Only Interviewee G felt that 
blurring tactics was not very common in business relationships at all. This might indicate that 
blurring in fact is a phenomenon worth visiting more within inter-firm communication 
research. It might indicate that there really is a lot of blurring, but we have to consider the fact 
that, although we tried to explain the phenomenon as good as we could. There is room for 
error here. Blurring is of such an abstract theoretical construct that some of the incidents they 
think of when answering a lot might be mixed up with opportunism. This is impossible to say 
however, and we have to go by our findings that strengthens the notion about blurring being a 
fairly common business phenomena. 
 
65 
 
We were given several examples as to both blurring and opportunistic acts, and have tried to 
sort them out, and separate blurring from the forest of opportunistic acts. 
 
Research Question 1B: To what degree does the exchange partner believe that blurring 
tactics is being used in their business/business relationships?  
Drawing on Table 3, we get an interesting finding in light of what respondents answered on 
Research Question 1A. There seem to be a discrepancy when it comes to a belief about others 
practicing this phenomena opposed to own experiences with it. This can maybe be explained 
by that there is a unwillingness to open up to two students writing a masters degree in fear of 
being exposed. A fear of a lack of anonymity control might cause respondents to positively 
answer that most people take part in blurring tactics, while not admitting that they are 
themselves doing it on a larger basis. Research Question 1A was formed as a projective 
technique with this in mind. And Research Question 1B as a kind of “control” measure for 
this. 
 
However it must be said that 50% answering that it has happened/or happens in their own 
firm in fact can be said to indicate that “most people do it”. At least the two findings aren’t 
working against each other. 
 
Another thing worth mentioning is that a couple of respondents, hence A and E, said that the 
industry that they were in were the reason for them not answering a lot of blurring. A is in the 
consulting business, hence he doesn’t have a lot of blurring happening to his own relations, 
even though he daily deals with this sort of thing consulting for others. E is a member of the 
University of Agder, a lecturer, and thereby he doesn’t deal with a lot of blurring on a day to 
day basis. He had, despite this, a lot of experiences and knowledge to contribute with. 
 
Research Question 2: What type of knowledge/information is believed being most likely 
to be blurred by the exchange partner?  
We were able to identify some types of content being blurred more than others. Non-specific 
examples of blurring the profit-margin were very common. Both Interviewee E and B could 
elaborate on this. Further on several of the other interviewee’s also mentioned this. It was 
something that was very common in the deal-negotiation process. That might be natural when 
looking back at that our sample mostly consists of vertical purchasing-seller relationships. 
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Blurring of power-dependency was also quite widely experienced. According to Example B1 
it was pretty common to do this in different ways. One of the more “serious” ways of trying to 
alter ones relative power/dependency upon the other part was to manufacture fake offers. 
These examples demonstrates that blurring about such characteristics is successful in 
portraying oneself as being a stronger market participant relative to the other part than what 
might be the case. The fact that the tactic concerning fake offers can be found in several 
industries and companies might be because it is a simple and effective way of blurring this 
sort of information. The respondents mentioned that this was not a tactic they have only used 
ones, but one that was common in several negotiation.  
 
Another tactic that seems to be a successful way of getting an edge over the other part in the 
relationship is by blurring total cost. It seems to be a fairly common tactic for getting a deal. 
While offering a low intro price and not informing about higher follow-up costs you are 
consciously blurring total costs. The fact that several of the respondents having had 
experiences with this may indicate that this as well is a successful way of getting hands on a 
greater earning on a short-term basis. 
 
Blurring information about who was the decision maker in the purchasing process was 
another common tactic in our sample. This was done to protect oneself against biases and to 
slow down the purchasing process. 
 
Our final blurring is a typical tactic of blurring the real goal, normally in this setting an 
economical one. Blurring of this goal when related to sales was done by using “the rule of 
reciprocation”. This was reported as a rather good tactic for sales. Norwegians gets easily 
blinded by these types of approaches. 
 
An important implication of these findings is that blurring tactics seem to operate and exist in 
inter-firm relationships. They must be somewhat successful, at least over the short-term, to 
have survived as tactics still being used. 
 
Research Question 3A: Is there a link between asset specificity and use of blurring?  
As presented in Table 1 and Table 2, our sample relationships mostly consist of vertical 
purchasing-seller connections. This might be one explanation behind why we did not get the 
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results we had hopes for. To invest a great deal of money into a vertical relationship, you 
would gradually come nearer to vertical integration, taking the supplier into your own internal 
value chain. This is perhaps not such a common phenomenon in the area of business we 
explored.  
 
Some of our interviewee’s actually mentioned that they consciously kept suppliers at “an 
arm’s length”, which is kind of an opposite tactic from investing in the relationship. By 
applying this tactic you would want to keep a little distance so that you can easily change if 
there were to surface a better alternative. Most of our respondents did not show any interest in 
investing in their relationship, especially not an investment that could be seen as being asset 
specific. 
 
Conclusion: Because of the lack of information concerning asset specificity we do not feel we 
can answer this research question. 
 
Research Question 3B: Is there a negative link between the length of the relationship 
and blurring?  
Drawing on the findings from table 6, we see that most of our respondents think that blurring 
will occur more in a short –term than a long – term relationship. This could be because they 
have developed a trusting relationship with these relation and they do not wish or see the need 
to use such tactics. One would think that the relationship has been successful, since it has 
lasted for a long time, and therefore they do not want to take the risk of using blurring tactics 
in order to hide information from their relations. Even though there might be no investment in 
specific assets (refer to research question 3A), there might be a lot to lose if one gets caught 
using blurring tactics in a long-term relationships. Especially there has been invested a lot of 
time developing trust and good-will amongst each other in the relationship. And starting this 
process all over with a new part might be costly after all. 
 
Another aspects with regards to the projective interpretation is that this results might indicate 
that respondents typically are more inclined to use of blurring tactics in short-term than long-
term relationships themselves as well. The respondents elaborated on these themselves, 
several of them saying that there was less blurring involved with their long-term relationships. 
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Conclusion; Our findings seem to indicate that there actually might be a negative link 
between long-term relationship and use of blurring. 
 
Research Question 3C: Is there a positive association between cultural distance and the 
use of blurring tactics?  
 
A few of our respondents mentioned that cultural differences could in fact be affecting the use 
of blurring tactics. They also mentioned differences they had with doing business with other 
cultures, different from their own.  
 
Most of our respondents felt that blurring tactics was something that was used just as much 
outside Norway than within. They also mentioned that a higher degree of cultural difference 
probably would affect the relationship in several ways. Even though we were presented for 
different examples from different cultures, they didn’t have a lot of experience that cultural 
difference enhances the use of blurring tactics. 
 
From the example provided by Interviewee C in the results section, we see that blurring 
clearly is not just a Norwegian phenomenon, and according to this respondent blurring of 
similar types were very common when dealing with cross-cultural relationships. 
 
Concluding thoughts: It seems like our respondents have little experience with cross – cultural 
relationship, at least not enough to give us a better view of the relationship between cultural 
difference and the use of blurring. Although they have some examples of blurring used in a 
different culture, this is not enough to suggest a link between cultural distance and the use of 
blurring tactics.  
 
Research Question 3D:  Is there a link between power-dependency and use of blurring? 
 
When reviewing the examples found about power-dependency blurring we see that this is an 
important area. To establish a high sense of market-competition is important for purchaser, so 
that suppliers don’t register and behave as monopolist. This is the main motivation behind 
blurring of market position. The seller may also participate in such tactics to make the 
purchaser believe that the seller has a form of monopoly. This way he takes a risk by getting 
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exposed, but if he values the extra income by getting a better deal, then he might execute 
blurring tactics. 
 
Tactics like used in Example B5 goes against the law and is especially risky, even though a 
lot of participants seem to value the possible earnings higher than the possible risks. 
 
There seem to be a lot of blurring going on between firms out of balance; we have no 
observations as to if there are more blurring when the power is skewed vs. when it is 
balanced. However, all of our interviewee’s responded that they believed there were more 
blurring and opportunism when power was skewed vs. balanced. Further on we could not find 
information about any blurring tactics being used when firms were participating in a balanced 
relationship. This is of course no evidence to conclude either way. But nonetheless our 
findings in this dimension open up for that it might be a correlation here. This should be 
further investigated with some sort of quantitative study. 
 
Research Question 3E: Is there a negative relationship between perceived level of trust 
and degree of blurring tactics used in the relationship? 
 
Our basis for evaluating this question is a bit fragile. Only one of our respondents gave us a 
clear indication that trust in fact is correlated with reduced levels of blurring in relationships. 
However, most of our respondents valued long-term relationships as being more trustworthy. 
 
The respondent, who gave us the indication, was in a different type of industry than our other 
respondents. We cannot be sure, but that might be a reason for why he was the only one to 
give us such a clear indication. 
 
We do not feel that the one response we got from the respondent is enough to establish a link 
between perceived level of trust and the degree of blurring tactics used in relationships. But 
with more research in other types of relationship, we might be able to discover a link. 
 
 
 
70 
 
Research Question 4: Are there observable attempts to exploit judgmental errors in 
inter-firm relationships? 
 
Status Quo Bias: 
To start out with Interview B’s experience: Prices were unnaturally high and not adjusted 
until a competitors offer were presented. This indicates speculation in the status quo bias, the 
already established supplier probably hoped for interviewee B to stick with them even though 
he found other alternatives. Discovering that this might not be the case, they tried to keep him 
by dropping prices. 
 
62,5% of our sample has experiences with the Status Quo Bias. That makes it seem as though 
this is something quite regularly exploited in the market. 
 
We found several examples of the use of this blurring tactic, and also some examples about 
interesting protections against this bias. Interviewee G, and D has incorporated norm in their 
firm, an established rule that every relationship is reconsidered every so and so years. This 
hinders the status quo of getting a grip of the relationship responsible.  
 
Default Bias: 
 
Example DB1 and 2: The default bias seems to operate at two levels here; first a standard 
package is offered which is neither the “biggest” or “smallest” quantum possible of ordering. 
A package in between is normally the default. Second, in reality it is normally possible to 
order whatever quantum you would like, given that you adjust to transportation specifications, 
nevertheless this is normally not a choice. 
 
It seems as though the default bias is something that might go on in a lot of business to 
business sales. We did not get a lot of examples regarding this bias in our interviews, but we 
imagine that it might be more common than initial thoughts suggest. And further research 
would be interesting. 
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Evaluability Bias:  
It might be difficult for a person to evaluate conditions and specifications when not having 
comparable specifications at the time of decision. Example EB1 and EB2 illustrates for us that 
purchasing can be a rather difficult process in the sense that some products might become 
more and more advanced. Thereby, increasing the possible use of the evaluability bias. We 
have two respondents giving us examples of such exploitation in real life, and we infer that 
this also is happening from time to time. 
 
Framing Effects: 
Framing effects might be the one effect most known to us in our everyday lives. With 
television commercials or similar, with good reason, tend to emphasize and put weight on the 
good elements of their product. And make sure that it is presented in such a way that the less 
positive things seem less probable. In example, that 20% of the slim-pill eating participants 
lost weight, instead of saying that 80% will not lose any weight at all. 
 
So do we find this applied between businesses in our sample? Even though our sample for 
analysis consists of most purchasing (6) and some sales representatives (2) it might be so that 
the purchasing representatives have noticed sales people trying to take advantage of this 
framing effect. 
 
We find a few experiences with framing effect in our sample, but it is very little and not 
sufficient to imply anything. However it seems as though it is being used in different ways to 
promote sales; Only emphasizing good sides of their product, downplaying service-costs, and 
appealing to the technical representatives by framing a product as being high-tech. 
 
8. Managerial Implications 
 
”Organizations need to be competitive in their relationships with others” (DeWit and Meyer, 
2004 p. 369). Yours and your partners objectives are often very different, because of this it is 
important that when you are in a relationship, that you also go after your own agendas (DeWit 
and Meyer, 2004 p. 369). You need to at times confront your partner, and demand your own 
interest being taken care of. “Without the will to engage in competitive interaction, the 
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organization will be at the mercy of more aggressive counter-parts – e.g. suppliers will charge 
excessively for products, buyers will express stiff demands for low prices, governments will 
require special efforts without compensations, and rival firms will poach among existing 
customers.” (DeWit and Meyer, 2004 p. 369) 
 
Of course not all firms are in a position to act very competitive. A firm need to have the 
power to actual fight against its competitors, and have the power to actually win the fight. A 
firm needs resources and resource dependency in order to achieve the power its needs to 
compete.  Resource dependency is the most common source of power for most firms. If a firm 
is very independent and also have resources that other firms are dependent on, that means that 
the firm has a lot of power and can use this when it compete. The more independent you are, 
and the more dependent your competitors are, the more you have (De Wit and Meyer, pp. 369 
-370).   
 
A firm cannot just compete with their competitors, at times it is necessary to cooperate with 
them. Sometimes a firm is not able to succeed by working alone, and has to cooperate with 
other firms. Often it’s beneficial for both parties to work together, and although they might 
have some different interest they do have a common goal to work together towards.  If a firm 
is not willing to work with other firms, they most likely will miss out on some great 
opportunities (De Wit and Meyer, p. 370).   
 
A big problem with cooperating with other firm is opportunism. Opportunism includes 
blurring tactics. A firm might not be as truthful as they appear, and may try and take 
advantage of the partnership or alliance (De Wit and Meyer, p. 370).  One-way to “overcome 
the lure of opportunism is to build a long term commitment to one another” (De Wit and 
Meyer, p. 370). This should be mentally, with words and through inter-dependence with each 
other (De Wit and Meyer, p. 370).  For this to even be a possibility, to engage in such a 
dependent relationship, there has to be trust between the parties. They “need to trust each 
other’s intentions and actions” (De Wit and Meyer, p. 370).   
 
For a company that is not in the best power position towards its partner, needs to be aware of 
blurring tactics. It could easily be that the partners feel so secure with their power, that they 
would be willing to risk the relationship by using such tactics. Some might even think that if 
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they do get caught, their partner is more dependent on them, than they are on their partner. 
Therefore, if the relationship ends, their partner would suffer more.  Especially in a 
relationship were one of the parties is dependent on the other for its resources, that party 
needs to be aware of blurring tactics. In such a relationship, that partner is often more 
dependent on its partner than the other way around.  
 
All parties should also be aware of bounded rationality, and their own cognitive limitations. A 
good idea would be to read books and articles about the subjects, so that you can be prepared. 
This way you can know what to expect and you could also be prepared and maybe have the 
ability to overcome the limitations. In example you might not fall for the same “tricks” you 
would before, like the one where the seller emphasize the good aspects of a product, while 
downsizing the lesser qualities. Here you might be able to see what they are doing, and look at 
the product specifics for what they are. 
 
As we can read from our results, one of our respondents has been able to find a way to protect 
them self from a bias. In order to establish protection against the status quo bias, they 
negotiated new deals every five years. The same should be sought after with the other biases 
as well. Ways to protect against them. In example, demanding to have a possibility to evaluate 
all alternatives at the same time to hinder the evaluability bias, and so on. 
 
When collaborating with a foreign firm, it is important to consider the different cultures. If 
you are in business with a firm that has a considerable different culture than your home 
country, you need to learn about that culture and consider its aspects when working with that 
culture. If could be in example if you are doing business in a Muslim country, that you should 
not choose a female employee to handle that account. This might be seen as very 
discriminating in your country, but could be a very important and sensitive aspect in the 
foreign country.  
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9. Future Research 
 
Our research has been successful in discovering different blurring tactics in relationships 
amongst Norwegian firms. We have also been able to find some links between some of our 
dimensions and blurring. There is still a lot to research to be done, and therefore we 
encourage others to continue with the research. Research especially, with respect to asset 
specificity, trust and cultural differences should be further studied, but also with other 
dimensions from our research. We hope that our thesis may help someone with a quantitative 
study, and from there discover more about this subject. 
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